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ABSTRACT 
This thesis develops methods to identify certain infrastructure vulnerabilities from 
the accidental or intentional release of a chemical agent from a U.S. Chemical Warfare 
Stockpile and Facility (CF).   For the region surrounding any CF, a “multi-infrastructure 
network operations model” (MINO) is created from various infrastructure datasets: 
MINO covers the local population, road network, and emergency-response systems.  
Standard software generates a chemical-agent-release scenario that requires the 
evacuation of part of the region, and that blocks emergency responders from using certain 
roads.  Using shortest-path methods, one version of MINO then identifies evacuation 
routes that the local population will likely use, showing where traffic congestion may 
slow evacuation. Another version computes and compares emergency-response distances, 
pre-release and post-release, for areas outside the contaminated region.  Two or three 
scenarios are examined for each of six CFs.  The areas surrounding Newport, Indiana, 
and Pueblo, Colorado, CFs show low evacuation numbers and low traffic intensities.  For 
the Anniston, Alabama; Blue Grass, Kentucky; and Umatilla, Oregon CFs, several roads 
exhibit high traffic intensities that may slow evacuations.  Several of these scenarios, 
along with one Pueblo incident, also show significant travel-distance increases for 
emergency-responders.  Software limitations prohibit analysis of the CF at Tooele, Utah. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This thesis examines the effects to the functionality of local infrastructure in the 
event of a major chemical-agent release from one of the remaining United States 
Chemical Warfare Stockpiles and Facilities (CFs).  A multi-infrastructure network 
operations model (MINO) represents the interactions between the local population and 
certain infrastructure, specifically, the road network and the emergency-response system 
(ERS).  For any catastrophe scenario, MINO highlights road segments that may become 
overburdened by evacuees, and identifies areas with degraded access by emergency 
responders and to hospitals. 
Several steps are necessary to build and solve each instance of MINO.  For each 
CF, the first step builds an interconnected MINO network model that links the local 
population and emergency-response systems through the local road network.  U.S. 
Census 2000 data provides population data by “block” (small census tract), and provides 
road data.  Emergency-response system data, which includes hospital facilities, fire 
stations, Emergency Medical Services, and ambulance providers, is derived from a 
database provided by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA).   
A commercial dispersion model HPAC (Hazard Prediction and Assessment 
Capability) defines a “chemical-agent-release scenario” based on several parameters, 
including type of chemical agent, release point, wind speed and wind direction.  The 
scenario describes the area that is likely to be contaminated.  (Two or three scenarios are 
analyzed for each CF.)  MINO then expands the contaminated region with a buffer zone, 
to create an “evacuation area,” and assumes that (1) all people within the evacuation area 
must evacuate, and (2) after evacuation, no emergency services may use any roads within 
the evacuation area, nor may anybody seeking to reach a hospital use one of those roads.  
Finally, MINO applies two models, an evacuation model and an emergency-response-
system (ERS) model, to analyze the effect that the estimated road restrictions have on 
evacuation and emergency response.  
The evacuation model assumes that each population group (population in a census 
block) within the evacuation area will follow their shortest route to leave that area.  The 
 xvi
model computes these routes with a standard shortest-path algorithm.  (By computing 
evacuation routes backwards, only a single shortest-path calculation is needed.)  With 
evacuation paths for each population group defined, traffic intensity on each road 
segment in the evacuation area is computed, and heavily used roadways are highlighted.  
The results also identify areas outside the evacuation area that will encounter the most 
evacuees.  This may be important for emergency planning of food, shelter, medical care, 
etc. 
The ERS model investigates how, after the catastrophe, unusable pieces of the 
road network affect the response distances for emergency responders working in the 
evacuation area, and distances required by the population to reach hospital facilities.   
The model calculates ERS distances and “closest-hospital distances” for all population 
groups, pre-release and post-release, within the evacuation area.  The difference between 
these two results is mapped graphically to highlight areas that may experience severely 
degraded emergency services, or none at all.  
Wind direction significantly affects results in the two or three scenarios analyzed 
for each CF.  Results for the Newport Chemical Depot, Indiana, show a robust road and 
ERS network that provides multiple exit routes for evacuating traffic and redundant 
coverage for emergence-response systems.  Scenarios for the Anniston Chemical 
Activity, Alabama, show larger impacts because of a larger local population.  Except for 
a few areas, changes in ERS distances are small in the Anniston scenarios, however.   
The area surrounding the Blue Grass Chemical Activity, Kentucky is heavily 
populated, but two scenarios, using seasonally prevailing winds, show no mass 
evacuations because neither resulting evacuation area covers a major city.  However, with 
several road segments exhibiting high-intensity traffic, the evacuations are still 
significant events.  ERS distances also increase in many areas to the west of Blue Grass.  
For the Pueblo Chemical Depot, Colorado, prevailing winds imply almost no impact to 
the population and infrastructure modeled by the MINO.  However, a worst-case 
scenario, with wind blowing into the city of Pueblo, creates a mass evacuation, closes all 
hospitals in the model area, and significantly increases emergency-response distances 
southeast of the city.   
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Major differences appear in evacuation results for the two scenarios examined for 
the Umatilla Chemical Depot, Oregon.  Nearly 100,000 more people evacuate in one 
scenario than the other.  In the worst case, ERS capabilities are also heavily affected, 
because a large number of evacuees become isolated from hospital facilities. 
Because of the network’s design and implementation, software limitations did not 
allow analysis of the region surrounding the Deseret Chemical Depot, Utah.    
MINO should be useful for assessing and guiding improvements in existing 
emergency-response plans near CFs.  Its methods could also be applied to chemical, 
biological, and nuclear disasters, and to certain natural disasters like floods. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. OVERVIEW 
This thesis investigates and models the effects of a malicious or accidental release 
of a chemical agent upon infrastructure located at and near Chemical Warfare Stockpiles 
and Facilities (CFs) in the United States.  Research addresses cascading effects to select 
infrastructure, specifically road networks, public-health systems, and emergency-
response systems. The ultimate purpose is to identify road segments that are critical for 
effective evacuation of a contaminated or soon-to-be contaminated area, and how 
emergency-response times may increase in the “safe area,” just outside the area to be 
evacuated.   
B. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
This thesis is developed in cooperation with USNORTHCOM-NORAD/J2, Joint 
Intelligence Operations Center North, in support of the defense of the Homeland.  The 
motivation comes from a need to identify infrastructure that is vulnerable to the 
accidental or malicious release of a chemical-warfare agent from a CF, where these 
agents are being stored and destroyed. 
The U.S. no longer produces chemical agents, and has agreed to completely 
destroy all chemical-weapons, chemical-agent inventories, and production facilities 
(CMA 2007a).  Two CFs have completed or nearly completed destruction of their agents, 
and the other six have relatively firm “destruction schedules” in place.  But, until all 
agents are destroyed by 2023 (Eisler 2006), emergency-preparedness planners and 
military agencies must continue to improve contingency plans for a catastrophic 
chemical-agent release.  This thesis will help identify and characterize certain related 
infrastructure vulnerabilities to assist contingency planners. 
In the event of a chemical-agent release, efficient evacuation of the contaminated 
area will be a top priority for public safety.  One model developed in this thesis, the 
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“evacuation model,” identifies road segments that may become over-capacitated during 
an evacuation: this can alert officials to take appropriate traffic-control measures and plan 
alternate routes around congested areas.  Using an “emergency-response system model,” 
this thesis also examines the effect of a chemical-agent release on emergency-response 
systems by identifying areas that may suffer from degraded emergency-responder 
services, and by identifying areas that may be isolated from hospitals or other emergency 
care.  Here “planners,” hereafter defined as emergency preparedness planners, military 
contingency planners, local agency planners, etc., could consider alternate transportation 
options or identify non-local emergency-response services to augment local ones.      
C. METHODOLOGY 
The thesis first characterizes the operational environment surrounding each CF of 
interest, including the composition of its stockpile and the planned destruction schedule.  
A summary of chemical-agent effects upon specific infrastructure systems includes a 
description of the likely impact to those infrastructures.  With a chemical-agent release 
into the environment from a known CF—such a release is hereafter referred to as a 
“chemical catastrophe”—analysis will examine the effects on a few of several possible 
infrastructure systems.     
Utilizing modeling and simulation to analyze the effects of chemical catastrophe 
is not new.  In fact, an existing dispersion model will be used in this thesis to estimate the 
extent of the contamination area.  Certain research in evacuation modeling for large 
geographical areas suggests simulation as a method to analyze traffic flow (Li et al. 2006, 
Han et al. 2006).  Other literature suggests the use of optimization, networks, and 
dynamic flows for analytical purposes (e.g., Mamda et al. 2004, Liu et al. 2005).   
In Mamda, et al., they suggest shortest-path and quickest-path approaches using 
multiple sinks, and they also describe a dynamic network model with a time element to 
address traffic congestion.  Although the time factor is beyond our scope, the discussion 
of static networks using multiple sinks is useful.  In the study of hurricane evacuation by 
Liu, et al., optimization is used to identify traffic control plans, but then simulation is 
used for the evacuation.  However, Liu, et al., does discuss the critical issue of emergency 
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response team routing, but leaves it for further study.  This thesis chooses a network-
optimization approach that uses shortest-path techniques to identify routes for evacuees, 
emergency responders, and people trying to reach hospital facilities.    
For each CF, a multi-infrastructure network-operations model, MINONET, is 
constructed with several sets of infrastructure data, e.g., road data, population census 
data, hospital locations.  A chemical catastrophe at a CF is then posited, defined by 
parameters for agent type, wind speed and direction.  Standard chemical-agent-dispersal 
software calculates agent dispersal based on those parameters, and a contaminated area is 
calculated.  An “evacuation area” is then defined, consisting of the contaminated area 
plus a buffer zone around that area; all people must evacuate from the evacuation area, 
and all vehicle traffic is forbidden in the area after evacuation.  Two application models 
are then built on top of MINONET to examine two “interdependent-infrastructure 
contingency events”;  population evacuation from the designated evacuation area, and the 
effect on emergency-response systems (ERSs) after the evacuation.  We refer to these 
two “contingency-response models” as MINOEVAC and MINOERS, respectively.  We use 
“MINO” as a generic term to mean the application of MINOEVAC and/or MINOERS to 
MINONET, along with ancillary computations to put data into the correct format for input, 
output, and analysis purposes.  
MINOEVAC uses shortest-path methods to estimate traffic intensity on the road 
network resulting from the local population evacuating the evacuation area.  Estimated 
traffic intensity on each road segment points to segments that are critical for effective 
evacuations.  By identifying over-capacitated roadways, planners can adjust disaster 
plans by considering alternate routes for evacuation and emergency services, allocation of 
police for traffic control, and other measures.  With the mapping of expected traffic 
routes and population flow, MINOEVAC can also identify nearby regions that will need to 
absorb large numbers of potentially contaminated evacuees.  This information can be 
used to make special planning arrangements for food, shelter, medical care, etc. 
MINOERS uses a similar methodology to calculate the “shortest-response 
distance” from each “population group” to the nearest hospital and the nearest emergency 
responder.  (Population groups, also used in evacuation modeling, aggregate the 
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population in a census tract into a single homogeneous group.)  After the chemical 
catastrophe, emergency responders and the local population are prohibited from using the 
road network in the evacuation area for travel.  MINOERS compares the response 
distances for hospitals and emergency responders after the chemical catastrophe (with 
travel prohibitions imposed) to the normal distances.  This distribution of increased ERS 
distances for each population group, when mapped geographically, highlights areas with 
no nearby hospital facilities and emergency responders.  Planners should consider 
augmenting emergency services or dedicating transportation services to supplement the 
remaining ERS capabilities, for any area with a significantly increased ERS distance.  
Ultimately, planners can use these results to improve emergency courses of action and 
emergency preparedness plans.   
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
This thesis is not meant to be an authoritative source for understanding the basic 
characteristics and effects of chemical agents.  The cause of the chemical catastrophe is 
not the focus of this thesis; the catastrophe is an assumed event.  Given that the event 
occurs under posited environmental conditions—these conditions define a “scenario”—
an existing model (DTRA 2004) identifies the dispersion plume for the catastrophic 
chemical-agent release and determines “the contaminated area.”  Only a few catastrophe-
scenarios are modeled for each CF analyzed, and actual incidents could vary significantly 
from these scenarios.   
The geographical area covered by each scenario is limited to keep the resulting 
network model from exceeding the capabilities of analytical software, specifically 
Microsoft Excel (Walkenbach 2004).  The spreadsheet limitations of Excel, specifically, 
the maximum number of rows and columns, are the primary factors constraining the size 
of network analyzed.  In fact, because of these limitations, of the six CFs for which 
analysis would be useful, only five are analyzed in this thesis.  The road network 
surrounding one CF is simply too complex for the current software implementation to 
handle.  
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E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II begins with a short primer on chemical agents stored at CFs in the 
United States.  The chapter continues with an operational environment assessment for 
each CF, and then discusses general effects chemical agents could have on exposed 
infrastructure systems.  Chapter II ends with a description of the software used for 
calculating the contaminated areas for the various chemical-catastrophe scenarios.   
Chapter III describes the methods used for analyzing effects on local 
infrastructure.  First, the multi-infrastructure network-operations model (MINONET) is 
developed.  Next, the thesis describes the construction of hypothetical chemical-
catastrophe scenarios.  The rest of Chapter III develops MINO further, and describes the 
two contingency-response models, MINOEVAC and MINOERS built on top of MINONET.  
Chapter IV applies the MINOEVAC and MINOERS to each CF, for two or three scenarios, 
and describes results.  Chapter V summarizes the thesis, points out key insights gained 
and recommends areas for future work. 
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II. OPERATIONAL-ENVIRONMENT ASSESSMENT 
This chapter briefly describes the chemical agents previously produced and now 
stored by the United States, for different types of weapons.  (More detail can be found in 
Army Field Manual 3-9, Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds; 
see Department of the Army 1990.).  Subsequently, a detailed operational-environment 
assessment for each CF describes its chemical-agent inventory and destruction plans.  
Finally, the chapter describes the likely effects of chemical agents on the infrastructure 
systems of interest in this thesis.   
A. U.S. CHEMICAL AGENTS      
The majority of U.S. chemical-weapon agents are of two basic types, nerve agents 
and blister agents.  These agents may exist as solids, liquids, or gases, depending on how 
they were produced and how they are stored.  Chemical agents are designed to kill, 
seriously injure, or incapacitate people.  The effects on infrastructure systems such as 
roads and buildings are not well known, but chemical agents can persist and remain lethal 
within those systems for up to 16 weeks (DTRA 2001).   
1. Agent Persistence 
Determining the length of time that an agent retains lethality, i.e., its 
“persistence,” is important for any operations or activity in and around a contaminated 
area. Several factors influence the persistence of chemical agents, including the type of 
agent, the agent’s volatility, and local weather, and terrain.  In general, nerve agents and 
blister agents are the least volatile and the most persistent of chemical agents.  The 
United States maintains no inventories of other agents, such as blood and choking agents. 
Weather can affect an agent in several ways.  Wind can disperse an agent rapidly 
in open country so that its concentration becomes non-lethal; however, the contaminated 
may also increase in size with wind dispersion, and an agent may be blown into terrain 
and vegetation that can increase its persistence.  High temperatures decrease, and low 
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temperatures increase, persistence (DTRA 2001).  Rain disposes, dilutes and promotes 
hydrolysis of an agent and thus reduces an agent’s lethality.  However, rain does not 
neutralize any agents (DTRA 2001).  
The terrain and vegetation in an affected area also play a key role in determining 
persistence.  Chemical agents tend to flow over rolling terrain and follow the contours of 
the earth’s surface, with the heavier concentrations remaining close to the ground.  Areas 
of heavy vegetation reduce wind speed and sunlight, thereby increasing persistence 
(DTRA 2001).  
 Importantly, the nerve agents and blister agents stored in U.S. CFs are highly 
persistent.  Following a chemical catastrophe with one of these agents, persistence will 
most affect first responders and clean-up efforts.  While persistence must be understood 
and considered for any chemical-agent release, this thesis assumes that the agent involved 
in any catastrophe will persist for the duration of analysis.  Furthermore, since the 
analysis covers a short period of time following a catastrophe, it assumes that the size and 
shape of the contaminated area stays constant.   
2. Nerve Agents 
Nerve agents cause several violent physiological actions.  When inhaled, ingested, 
or absorbed into the body through the skin or mucous membranes, these agents inhibit 
enzymes throughout the body, disturbing nerve-signal transmission.  Major effects may 
include:  muscle stimulation with uncontrolled contractions followed by fatigue and 
usually paralysis, tightness in the chest, vomiting and diarrhea, secretions from air 
passageways, and convulsions or disturbances in the brain leading to death (Department 
of the Army 1990).  The two main nerve agents used in U.S. chemical weapons are the 
G-agent GB, and the V-agent VX.  These nerve agents all exist normally as viscous 
liquids.  G-agents are more volatile, persisting only up to two days, whereas V-agents can 
persist as long as 16 weeks (DTRA 2001). 
GB is a colorless, odorless liquid.  The initial vapor threat from GB exposure is 
the greatest threat.  The volatility of GB is an important physical factor as small droplets 
sprayed from a plane or released from an exploding shell may vaporize and never hit the 
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ground (Department of the Army 1990).  While GB vapor is lethal, it is less persistent 
than its liquid form, and does not condense on surfaces to become a contact threat.  G-
agents like GB do not persist for long periods as they decompose either naturally or with 
chemical neutralization techniques.  GB does mix with water easily, can contaminate 
water sources and can be spread through those sources.  However, contamination of 
water sources does not come into play in this thesis. 
V-agents have low volatility and thus high persistence.  VX is an oily, odorless 
liquid that does not vaporize easily, so it is mainly a liquid contact threat.  Exposure can 
take place when a droplet of spray contacts a person’s clothing or skin, or when a person 
touches a contaminated surface.  VX does not spread easily on surfaces and does not mix 
well with water.  VX by inhalation is approximately twice as toxic as GB by inhalation, 
but is up to 100 times more toxic through contact (Department of the Army 1990). 
3. Blister Agents 
Blister agents, also known as vesicants, are easily absorbed by the human body.  
These agents cause inflammation, blisters, and general destruction of moist tissues, 
especially eyes, mucous membranes, and the respiratory tract (Department of the Army 
1990).  All blister agents are strongly persistent, surviving up to eight weeks.  They are 
normally employed as colorless gases and liquids (DTRA 2001).  U.S. blister agents are 
of the mustard form, primarily Levinstein Mustard (H), Distilled Mustard (HD), and 
Mustard-T Mixture (HT). 
B. U.S. CHEMICAL WARFARE STOCKPILE 
CFs at eight Continental United States (CONUS) locations and one overseas 
location have stored and maintained the inventory of U.S. chemical weapons.  These 




Figure 1.   U.S. Chemical Warfare Stockpile Locations (Source: CMA 2007) 
 
On 29 April 1997, the United States agreed to the Chemical Weapons Convention 
and, in agreement with this convention, began the process of destroying all the chemical-
weapons, chemical-agent inventories, and production facilities (CMA 2007a).  By 
December 2000, all the chemical weapons on the Johnston Atoll had been destroyed 
(CMA 2007a).  In March 2006, the first U.S. CF, at the Edgewood Area of Aberdeen 
Proving Grounds in Maryland, completed destruction of its chemical-agent stockpile, 
which consisted of mustard agents (CMA 2007a).  As of May 2007, with Johnson Atoll 
and Edgewood destruction complete and other efforts underway, more than 44 percent of 
the entire U.S. chemical-weapons stockpile had been destroyed (CMA 2007a).   
Because agent destruction is nearing completion at the Pine Bluff Chemical 
Activity in Arkansas, that CF will only receive an operational summary in this thesis.  
The remaining six CFs comprise candidates for analysis. The following operational-
environment assessment for the seven CFs outlines the composition of their chemical-
agent stockpiles and provides other background information. 
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1. Pine Bluff Chemical Activity, Pine Bluff, Arkansas 
The Pine Bluff Arsenal (PBA) began storing chemical weapons in 1945.  Pine 
Bluff Chemical Activity, part of the PBA, is located north of Pine Bluff, Arkansas on the 
Arkansas River; see Figure 2.  Little Rock, Arkansas lies 30 miles north of the PBA.  The 
chemical weapons stored at Pine Bluff Chemical Activity consist of various munitions 
and one-ton containers containing GB or VX nerve agents, or HD blister agent (U.S. 
Army 2007c).  Disposal of these agents began in 2005 and, as of 19 May 2007, all 90,409 
GB nerve-agent rockets had been destroyed.  Destruction of VX rockets is scheduled to 
begin in late 2007 (CMA 2007e).  To date, 12 percent of the stockpile at Pine Bluff has 
been destroyed and the remaining stockpile should be destroyed by late 2008 
(Department of the Army 2006). 
 
 
Figure 2.   Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas (Source: Google Maps 2007). 
 
2. Newport Chemical Depot, Newport, Indiana 
The Newport Chemical Depot, lies southwest of Newport, Indiana, on the west-
central border of Indiana, about 60 miles west of Indianapolis; see Figure 3.  This CF 
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opened in 1941 and produced various warfare materials, including chemical agents, 
through the late 1960s.  Since that time, it has stored the liquid chemical agent VX in 
large steel containers.  Agent-destruction operations began in 2005 and, as of 15 May 
2007, workers had destroyed approximately 156,126 gallons of liquid VX, amounting to 
about 52 percent of the original agent stockpile (CMA 2007d). 
 
 
Figure 3.   Newport Chemical Depot, Indiana (Source: Google Maps 2007). 
 
3. Anniston Chemical Activity, Anniston, Alabama 
The Anniston Army Depot, located west of Anniston, Alabama, was established 
in 1941; see Figure 4.  Beginning in the 1960s, the Anniston Chemical Activity began 
maintenance and storage of chemical weapons at the Depot.  The Anniston Chemical 
Activity has stored various munitions and chemical agents containing GB or VX nerve 
agents or HD blister agent (U.S. Army 2007a).   
The Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility began construction in 2001, and 
began destroying chemical weapons in 2003.  By March 2006, 142,428 GB munitions 
and 96,246 gallons of GB nerve agent had been destroyed; no GB agent remains (CMA 
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2007c).  After completing the destruction of GB agent, destruction of VX-filled rockets 
began.  As of March 2007, all 35,662 VX-filled rockets and 41,056 gallons of VX had 
been destroyed (CMA 2007c).  Destruction operations will next process VX-filled 
artillery shells.  Overall, 27 percent of the chemical weapons stockpile at Anniston 
Chemical Activity had been destroyed as of May 2007 (U.S. Army 2007a). The projected 
date to complete all operations is early 2012 (Department of the Army 2006). 
 
 
Figure 4.   Anniston Army Depot, Alabama (Source: Google Maps 2007). 
 
4. Blue Grass Chemical Activity, Richmond, Kentucky 
The Blue Grass Army Depot, located near Richmond, Kentucky, houses the Blue 
Grass Chemical Activity; see Figure 5.  The Army has stored chemical weapons at this 
facility since 1944.  Located to the southwest of Richmond and 20 miles south of 
Lexington, Kentucky, the Blue Grass Chemical Activity currently stores 523 tons of 
chemical agents: blister agent in projectiles and nerve agents in projectiles and rockets 
(Blue Grass Chemical Stockpile Outreach Office 2006).  In 2003, a contract was awarded 
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to design, construct, and operate a facility to destroy the stockpile at Blue Grass.  As of 
May 2007, destruction of chemical agents has not yet begun.  
 
 
Figure 5.   Blue Grass Army Depot, Kentucky (Source: Google Maps 2007). 
 
 
5. Pueblo Chemical Depot, Pueblo, Colorado 
The Pueblo Chemical Depot, located east of Pueblo, Colorado, began storing 
chemical weapons during the 1950s; see Figure 6.  The nearest major city, Colorado 
Springs, lies 40 miles to the northwest of the storage facilities.  The Pueblo Chemical 
Depot houses a large stockpile of chemical weapons, including 2,611 tons of weapons 
with mustard (HD) agent (Pueblo Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant 2006).  The 
chemical weapons stored include artillery and mortar shells filled with mustard agent.  In 
2002, a contract was awarded to design, construct, and operate a facility to destroy the 




Figure 6.   Pueblo Chemical Depot, Colorado (Source: Google Maps 2007). 
 
 
6. Deseret Chemical Depot, Tooele, Utah 
The Deseret Chemical Depot, lies 30 miles southwest of Salt Lake City, Utah,  
just south of Tooele, Utah; see Figure 7.  The Army has stored almost 45 percent of the 
nation’s chemical weapons at the Deseret Chemical Depot since 1942 (U.S. Army 
2007f).  The Depot stores various chemical munitions and containers containing GB and 
VX nerve agents or H, HD, and HT blister agent (U.S. Army 2007d).   
The Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility completed construction in 1993, 
and began destroying chemical agents in 1996.  As of 1 May 2007, all of the Facility’s 
munitions containing GB nerve agent had been destroyed, and 1209 mustard-agent-filled 
one-ton containers had also been destroyed.  The latter quantity represents 17.4 percent of 
the Depot’s original mustard-agent stockpile (CMA, 2007a).  Overall, nearly 62 percent 




Figure 7.   Tooele Army Depot, Utah (Source: Google Maps 2007). 
 
 
7. Umatilla Chemical Depot, Umatilla, Oregon 
The Umatilla Chemical Depot lies six miles southwest of Umatilla, Oregon, and 
west of the larger city of Hermiston; see Figure 8.  On the north-central border of Oregon 
with Washington, the Depot is situated near the Columbia River and about 25 miles 
southwest of Kennewick, Washington.  The Umatilla Chemical Depot opened in 1941 
and began storing chemical weapons in 1962.  The Depot stores various munitions and 
containers containing GB or VX nerve agents or HD blister agent.   
The Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility completed construction in 2001 
and began destroying chemical weapons in 2004.  As of 17 May 2007, the facility had 
destroyed 139,393 chemical munitions and 962 tons of GB chemical agent, totaling 
nearly 26 percent of all the chemical agents at the Depot (CMA, 2007f).  The projected 
date to complete all operations is early 2011 (Department of the Army 2006). 
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Several major infrastructure systems surrounding any CF may be affected by 
chemical agents.  This thesis focuses on road, public-health, and emergency-response 
systems.  Additional infrastructure systems that may be impacted in a chemical 
catastrophe include Department of Defense (DoD) facilities, railroad networks, energy 
systems and services, water systems, and agriculture.  These other infrastructure systems 
are not directly relevant to the thesis, but they are discussed here for completeness and in 
consideration of future work.  Other infrastructure systems, such as banking and finance, 
commercial industries, information and telecommunications, are not considered to be 
significantly impacted due to the relatively rural locations of the CFs.  Although no 
specific data identify effects to the infrastructure, the following paragraphs summarize 
the likely effects and results, as suggested by the author, following a chemical 
catastrophe.   
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1. Road Network 
A large portion of the road network near a CF, including major traffic arteries, can 
become unusable in the event of a chemical catastrophe.  The loss of these roads can 
impact all of the other infrastructure systems because those systems, or key parts of them, 
may become inaccessible.  For example, cellular telephone towers and electric power 
substations might need repair, but become inaccessible and remain out of service.  Except 
for population evacuation, roads will be unusable until they have been decontaminated, 
either through natural degradation or through active neutralization by clean-up crews.  
Until roads are clear for use, transportation and emergency services will have to reroute 
around the contaminated area, and certain services may not have access to isolated areas.  
For example, ambulances may be unable to reach injured persons because certain roads 
are unusable. 
2. Public Health 
Protecting the local population from chemical agents is a significant issue for any 
CF.  In the event of a chemical catastrophe, local residents may be exposed, injured, and 
even killed.  The ability to evacuate and treat the public surrounding a CF must be 
considered.  Health services will degrade or even close down if healthcare facilities and 
emergency-responders fall within the contamination area and can no longer operate.  
Additionally, treating the population for normal health issues will become more 
complicated for a degraded emergency-response system. 
3. Emergency-Response Systems 
Local emergency-response systems, which include first-response capabilities and 
treatment facilities, may be lost or incapacitated during a chemical-catastrophe event.  
First responders, such as firefighters, ambulances, and police will be constrained by the 
contaminated area and may not be able to reach key population centers and casualties.  If 




respond or alternate access methods will be required, e.g., helicopter or watercraft.  These 
emergency-response systems will be modeled in this thesis to determine vulnerable 
population areas. 
4. Department of Defense (DoD) Facilities 
Because each CF is located on a military installation, a chemical catastrophe will 
impact all operations at the installation.  Each installation has plans to respond to such an 
event.  Most CF installations have few tenant operations, so the impact to other military 
functions will be limited.   
5. Railroad Network 
All of the CFs have railroads lines located nearby.  A contaminated railroad line 
will not be usable until decontamination is verified.  By examining railroad maps near 
CFs, it appears that the impact to rail transportation scheduled to transit a potentially 
affected area will be minimal, as most rail traffic can be rerouted around the area.  
Increases to time and fuel will not be significant because of the small increase in overall 
route lengths.  However, deliveries to the area near the CF will be completely stopped if 
rail yard facilities are contaminated.   
6. Energy Systems and Services 
Chemical agents should not have a direct impact on energy-supply systems such 
as generation facilities, gas and oil pipelines, and power lines.  However, personnel 
required to run, maintain, and repair systems may not be able to reach contaminated 
systems due to road-network contamination.   
7. Water Systems 
Local water systems directly contaminated by chemical agents will be a major 




reduces their effectiveness, it does not neutralize them, so contaminated water will be 
unusable (DTRA 2001).  Contaminated water will also be hazardous to wildlife and 
agricultural areas.  
8. Agriculture 
Chemical agents will affect livestock and crops in the contaminated area.  
Animals will experience the same effects as humans and will suffer casualties.  In fact, 
animal casualties may help map the extent of the chemical-agent contamination.  
Agricultural crops, like all vegetation, will absorb chemical agents and increase agent 
persistence.   
D. CHEMICAL CATASTROPHE 
How each infrastructure system is impacted will be a function of the chemical 
catastrophe, more specifically, its parameters: the agent involved, quantity of agent 
released, weather conditions, etc.  The specific details of how and why a chemical 
catastrophe occurs are beyond the scope of this thesis; the thesis simply assumes that a 
chemical catastrophe, with hypothetical parameters selected, has taken place at a specific 
CF.  The geographical extent of the catastrophe is computed for the set of parameters 
using a well-established dispersion model implemented in the HPAC software (DTRA 
2004).  MINO then determines which infrastructure components and systems are 
affected. 
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) uses the Hazard Prediction and 
Assessment Capability (HPAC) software for predicting chemical dispersion.  This thesis 
generates the chemical-catastrophe scenarios with it, for analysis.  HPAC predicts the 
effects of hazardous-material releases into the atmosphere and collateral effects on 
civilian and military populations (DTRA 2007).  Appendix A describes the HPAC model.   
Results from HPAC depend on user-specified weather conditions and, in turn, 
those significantly impact results from MINO.  Other than wind, the weather settings 
displayed in Table 1 are used in HPAC for all computational tests for all CFs. The 
primary wind directions and speeds for each CF scenario come from historical climatic 
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wind data from a 66-year period from 1930-1996, published by the National Climatic 
Data Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (NOAA NCDC 
1996).  In addition to these base cases with historical prevailing wind directions, other 
HPAC runs with different wind directions will be run to examine other, perhaps more 
devastating scenarios.    
 
Weather Parameter HPAC Setting (Fixed) Other Possible Settings 
Cloud Cover Broken Clear, Scattered, Overcast 
Surface Moisture Normal Dry, Wet 
Precipitation None (0.00 mm/hr) From Light Rain to Heavy Snow 
Table 1.   HPAC Weather Settings for Computational Tests 
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III. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
Following a catastrophe, a cascade of events will take place, some planned and 
others not.  In the case of a wide-spread chemical-agent release, a large portion of the 
local population will evacuate.  In fact, authorities will require at least part of that 
evacuation.  With a large-scale evacuation, certain segments of the road network may 
experience high traffic volumes, which will slow the evacuation and increase exposure 
risk to evacuees.  The first contingency-response model described in this chapter 
examines this problem and helps identify the likely routes and traffic intensities for 
evacuation planning.   
The emergency-response system should also expect a spike in activity.  Not only 
will people need treatment for chemical-agent exposure, but an evacuation, potential 
wide-spread panic, and a heavily loaded road system will all degrade the emergency-
response system’s performance.  The second contingency-response model described in 
this chapter captures part of this problem by determining how emergency-response 
distances change across the study because of unusable roads and ERS locations.    
A. POPULATION, ROAD, EMERGENCY REPONSE SYSTEM MODEL 
For this thesis, the infrastructure network MINOG  represents an interconnected 
network of roads, population, and emergency services. This undirected network, 
( , )MINOG N A= , is defined by:   
Nodes N with subsets 
 PN   representing population aggregations,  
 EN   representing locations for emergency-response units, 
 RN   representing road intersections, ( )R P EN N N N= − − , and 
 
Arcs A with subsets 
 PRA  representing connections of population nodes to road intersections 
( )PR P RA N N⊆ × , 
 RRA   representing actual road segments between intersections, 
   ( )RR R RA N N⊆ ×  
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 ERA   representing connections of emergency-response units to road intersections  
   ( )ER E RA N N⊆ × , and 
Numerical data to be described later. 
 
Constructing MINOG  requires accurate critical-infrastructure (CI) data.  The CI 
data is extracted from various unclassified datasets and then merged, using a common 
reference system: MINO uses latitude and longitude coordinates.  The construction 
process first defines the road-network infrastructure and then integrates the emergency-
response infrastructure, which includes the hospitals and first responders.  Population 
groups must also be represented and connected to the road network.  The following 
sections outline this process; appendix B contains more detail.   
Road and population data are taken from the 2000 Census TIGER database 
(Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing database) available to 
the public (ESRI 2007).  Each road segment from the database, for the study area, will 
correspond to an arc in RRA .  The union of arc endpoints over all arcs in RRA  forms the 
set of nodes RN .  The database contains much additional data, but the only additional 
data extracted are arc lengths, road names, and road types.  
Next, the human population is modeled and connected to the road network.  From 
the TIGER database, census population data is provided for small geographical areas, 
referred to as “blocks.”  A population node Pi N∈  will represent each census block 
population as a point geographically centered in the census block.  Some blocks contain 
no population and nodes are not created for these; population nodes containing five or 
fewer people are paired with neighboring, larger population nodes for simplicity. 
The final set of population nodes is then connected to the road network.  For each 
node Ri N∈ , a search procedure finds the two closest road nodes 1 2( ), ( ) Rj i j i N∈ , and 
arcs 1( , ( ))i j i  and 1( , ( ))i j i are created.  The union of all such arcs is 
PRA .  To ensure these 
artificial arcs are not used for transit, other than to get the population onto the road 
network or to allow emergency responders to reach the population, a large cost or length 
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C  is assigned to each.  That is, for all ( , ) PRijc C i j A= ∈ .  The full set of these arcs is 
defined by { }1 2( , ( )), ( , ( ))PPR i NA i j i i j i∈= ∪ . 
The ERS infrastructure data is provided by NGA from the Homeland Security 
Infrastructure Program database (“HSIP”; see NGA 2007).  From the ERS data, we select 
locations for two different ERS categories from each CF area.  The emergency-responder 
(ER) category includes Emergency Medical Services (EMS), fire stations, and ambulance 
providers.  The other category, referred to as “hospitals” here, actually includes hospitals 
and ambulatory surgical facilities.  As with population nodes, we attach each ERS node 
to the road network by two arcs; the collection of all such arcs is ERA .   Each arc 
( , ) ERi j A∈  has its true length assigned as its modeled length, i jc . 
MINOG contains all nodes, arcs and numerical data required for modeling the 
evacuations and emergency-response problems.  Figure 9 displays a geographic map of 
MINOG extracted from a section of the city of Pueblo, Colorado.   
 
 
Figure 9.   Example of MINOG Extracted from Pueblo, Colorado.   
House icons denote population nodes.  The blue lines, or lines connecting the house 
icons, are the artificial arcs connecting the population nodes to road nodes, and 
correspond to the arc set PRA .  The red “+” icon depicts the sole emergency-
response node from EN  in this small region; it is connected to the road network by 
two arcs from ERA .  The remaining lines (black in a color reproduction) represent 
the road arcs contained in the set RRA . 
 26
B. CATASTROPHE SCENARIOS 
With a complete infrastructure network, an abstract model for a chemical 
catastrophe is necessary to develop the scenario.  A scenario, s , and the application 
model being applied, simply alter the components in, and data associated with, MINOG .  
For each CF, a chemical-catastrophe scenario is run in HPAC based on the 
chemical agent in inventory, plus weather, terrain, and other factors.  Different sets of 
scenario parameters will cover most likely incidents, and some cover what the author 
believes may be nearly worst-case incidents.  For instance, a scenario using a prevailing 
wind direction may correspond to a “likely” incident with contamination being spread 
into lightly populated areas, but if the wind shifts 180 degrees, a heavily populated area 
could be contaminated in a worst-case incident.  Based on the scenario, an area 
surrounding the chemical facility is identified as the contamination area and effects will 
be assigned to critical infrastructure in that area and a surrounding buffer zone.   
HPAC utilizes plume and chemical-agent dispersal calculations to determine the 
contamination area.  HPAC takes the incident and release information (the combination 
of “where, what, and when” parameters and the specified environmental data), and 
predicts where the chemical-agent material will move through the atmosphere, and 
calculates its deposition on surfaces (DTRA 2004). HPAC’s atmospheric transport model 
is called SCIPUFF. It is a Lagrangian, Gaussian puff model that relates dispersion rates to 
measurable turbulent velocity statistics.  Further detail about SCIPUFF can be found in 
the HPAC 4.04 Users Manual (DTRA 2004). 
HPAC typically generates a roughly elliptical contamination area, referred to 
hereafter as the “contamination area.”  Figure 10 shows actual HPAC results for a 
scenario at the Umatilla Chemical Depot.  An ellipse approximates this contamination 
area, called the “contamination ellipse.”  Any person remaining in the contamination 
ellipse is likely to become sick and even die.  Since the actual extent of chemical-agent 
contamination cannot be mapped precisely, a buffer zone is added to the model’s 
contamination ellipse.  This buffer zone may be viewed as representing uncertainty in 
prediction, and (a) the fact that the local populace, fearing for its lives, is likely to 
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evacuate a large area surrounding the truly contaminated area, and (b) the fact that 
authorities will naturally build a buffer zone into their evacuation orders.  The area 
defined by the contamination ellipse and added buffer is referred to as the “evacuation 
ellipse” or “evacuation area.”  All models assume that the local population must be 
evacuated from anywhere inside the evacuation area.  Individual models will identify 
nodes within the defined evacuation area to assign appropriate penalties.     
 
 
Figure 10.   Example HPAC Chemical Catastrophe Result.   
This figure shows the contamination area identified by HPAC for a hypothetical 
scenario at the Umatilla Chemical Depot.  The Depot is denoted by a yellow 
triangle and colored ellipse-like areas represent different casualty levels in HPAC.  
The contamination area equates to the area within the outer-most blue solid line and 
is called the “Casualty Possible” area by HPAC (DTRA 2004).   
C. MULTI-INFRASTRUCTURE NETWORK OPERATIONS MODEL 
With the aforementioned datasets integrated into MINONET, the effects to specific 
infrastructures will be determined.  MINONET is parameterized for analysis after running 
the HPAC scenario for a particular scenario.   With a parameterized MINONET, a shortest-
path algorithm is solved for different contingencies, either population evacuation or 
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emergency response.  Each model is built in Microsoft Excel 2003 and processed using 
Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) algorithms.  The VBA shortest-path algorithms 
solve quickly, in less than a minute.   
1. Creating the Evacuation Ellipse and Parameterizing MINONET 
After running HPAC for a given scenario, the plotted contamination area is 
exported for approximation as a contamination ellipse.  The ellipse approximation 
simplifies the construction of the larger evacuation ellipse, which is used in evacuation 
and emergency-response system models.   
To generate the contamination ellipse equation, we first plot the contamination 
area and define the two extreme ends of that elongated area as the end points for the 
semimajor axis.  The area center ( , )c cx y is calculated by averaging the two end points.  
The angle of rotation ϕ  is also computed from the chord connecting the two end points.  
This center point is used to translate the contamination area and the angle ϕ  is used to 
rotate the area on axis.  With the area centered at the origin, the ellipse’s semimajor and 
semiminor axes are then measured; their lengths are denoted a and b , respectively.  The 
center point ( , )c cx y and angle ϕ  are recorded for use in the search functions.   
Next, the contamination ellipse is expanded into the evacuation ellipse based on 
two user-specified parameters.  The “width-expansion parameter,” EFw ,  increases the 
width of the semiminor axis by its value.  The thesis arbitrarily uses 4EFw =  throughout; 
other users of MINO will want to explore different values.  The “range-expansion 
factor,” EFr , increases the length of the semimajor axis; tests in this thesis set 1.1EFr = .  
This small value is used primarily to limit the size of MINONET.  (Larger increases to EFr  
may expand this network model beyond current software limitations.)  The evacuation 
ellipse, translated and rotated, is thus defined by 
   
2 2
2 2All coordinates ( , ) such that 1( ) ( )EF EF
x yx y
r a w b
+ ≤ . 
In terms of the original coordinate system then, the evacuation ellipse is defined by:   
 29
   All coordinates ( , )x y  such that 
2 2
2 2
[( ) cos ( )sin ] [( )cos ( )sin ] 1
( ) ( )
c c c c
EF EF
x x y y y y x x
r a w b
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ− + − − − −+ ≤ . 
MINOEVAC only marks population groups within the evacuation ellipse, whereas 
MINOERS marks all population groups and ERS locations, and assigns penalties to road 
arcs within the evacuation ellipse.  For population and ERS nodes, a simple binary value 
indicates if the node is inside the evacuation ellipse or not.  For road arcs in MINOERS, a 
search function looks at both nodes associated with the arc.  If either is within the 
evacuation ellipse, the road is considered unusable and the penalty C  is added.  
Specifically, for each ( , ) RRi j A∈ , if either i  or j  is within the evacuation area, then the 
nominal length of the arc, which is ijc , becomes ijc C+ .   
After integrating the chemical-catastrophe data into MINONET, that infrastructure 
model is applied to the evacuation model MINOEVAC, and the emergency-response model 
MINOERS.  The next two sections describe this process.  
2. The Evacuation Model 
After a chemical catastrophe, all population within the evacuation ellipse will 
depart for safety, or at least attempt to depart. MINOEVAC models this situation with 
( , )EVAC P R PR RRG N N A A= ∪ ∪ .  Also, the set of population nodes, PN , is divided into 
two sets:  the set of “unsafe” nodes that are inside the evacuation ellipse and must be 
evacuated and those which are deemed “safe” and do not require evacuation.   
In MINOEVAC, all pn  persons in each population group p  within the evacuation 
area, are assumed to evacuate that area by following the same shortest route to the closest 
safe node.  By solving a single shortest-path problem as described below, it is possible to 
identify the evacuation paths psQ  which each population group p  will use in scenario s .  






= ∑ . 
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It would seem necessary to solve a shortest-path problem for each population 
group p  within the evacuation ellipse.  This can be avoided, however, by solving a 
“reverse shortest-path problem” with unsafe nodes as sinks, and safe nodes as sources.  A 
single shortest-path calculation then identifies the shortest route for each population 
group, corresponding to a single node, to reach its nearest exit from the evacuation 
ellipse.  It is assumed that all persons within a population group follow the same shortest 
path, and thus it is easy to compute the number of persons traversing a given roadway.    
A label-correcting algorithm, implemented with a deque (double-ended queue), 
solves the shortest-path problem (Ahuju, Magnanti and Orlin 1993, p. 143).  The 
algorithm is modified to handle multiple sources by setting the distance label for each 
source node to 0, and placing each such node on the deque before beginning distance 
updates for the rest of the nodes.  It is then a simple matter to use the optimal predecessor 
function, along with population values, to compute traffic intensities rsv .     
The evacuation model estimates traffic intensities for road segments used to 
evacuate the evacuation area.  Identifying the most used paths, i.e., those paths with the 
greatest amount of population movement, will help provide insight into which roads will 
be heavily used and potentially cause traffic problems during the evacuation.  Results will 
also show which safe areas will need to absorb the largest numbers of evacuees.   
3. The Emergency-Response System Model 
We create two variants of the ERS model, MINOERS.  The first, MINOERS1 helps 
identify where the local population may have difficulty in reaching a hospital facility 
after the chemical catastrophe.  The second, MINOERS2, determines if safe population 
nodes can be reached by emergency responders.  In both variants, the model identifies 
isolated population nodes that might require access by means of alternate transportation 
(e.g., helicopter) or by non-local emergency-response units.  Both variants also identify 
travel-distance increases between population groups and respective emergency services.  
By mapping population nodes with significantly increased distances, emergency-response 
planners can identify vulnerable areas. 
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MINOERS uses RESPG to represents the post-catastrophe network for evaluating 
changes in emergency response.  This graph is defined by  
( , )
where
All nodes  outside the evacuation ellipse, and

















Prior to the parameterization of MINONET, using the basic MINOG , one shortest-
path solution from MINOERS1 identifies baseline shortest paths from each population 
node to the closest hospital facility.  Another solution, from MINOERS2,  identifies the 
baseline shortest paths from each population node to the nearest emergency responder. 
The baseline shortest-path distances for each population group p  are denoted 0Hpd and 
0E
pd for hospital and emergency responders, respectively.  After the baseline distances are 
calculated, each road arc within the evacuation area is assigned a penalty to inhibit travel 
through the evacuation area, as described earlier.  The model next recalculates shortest 
paths using RESPG  for the hospital facilities and emergency responders, calculating post-
catastrophe distances, 1Hpd  and 
1E
pd , to compare to baseline distances.  Specifically, the 
differences 1 0H Hp pd d−  and 1 0E Ep pd d−  will be evaluated for safe population groups p.  
We solve these shortest-path problems using the same algorithm as used for 
MINOEVAC.  The algorithm is implemented almost identically to the evacuation model 
algorithm and executes twice, once for hospitals, MINOERS1, and once for emergency 
responders, MINOERS2.     
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IV. MODEL SCENARIOS, ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
This chapter describes the development of MINO for each CF, details on the 
chemical-catastrophe scenarios examined, and results from the evacuation and ERS 
models for those scenarios.  Following presentation of analytical results, a short summary 
for each CF characterizes potential vulnerabilities to the local population and 
infrastructures for the scenarios analyzed.  These scenarios represent hypothetical 
situations and as a reminder, only a few specific scenarios are examined for each 
location, and they represent only a small fraction of the possible scenarios that could 
occur.   
The discussion in Chapter 2, Section D applies for all CFs, and that discussion is 
not repeated here.  For reasons noted earlier, no summary is included for the Pine Bluff 
Chemical Activity.  As explained later, the Deseret Chemical Depot is not fully analyzed 
because of software limitations.  Google Earth and Keyhole Markup Language (KML) 
are used to display MINO results; see Appendix C for details.    
A. ROAD TRAFFIC RESULTS FROM MINOEVAC 
To relate road-traffic results from MINOEVAC to an expected roadway congestion 
level, a “traffic-intensity scale” is developed here to help estimate traffic speeds in an 
evacuation. A slow evacuation will increase the potential for additional contamination of 
the population and cause more casualties.  For simplicity, the following assumptions are 
made:  each vehicle contains 2.0 persons, traffic travels on two out-bound freeway lanes, 
and the evacuation transpires in a two-hour window.  (No further attempt has been made 
to incorporate actual road capacity, additional roads, etc.)  With these assumptions, 
interpolations can be made from the 2005 Urban Mobility Report’s Freeway Speed 
Estimation Curves (Schrank and Lomax 2005) to create Table 2.   
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Traffic Intensity (Persons) Evacuation Speed (mph) 
Up to 3,750 60 mph (minimal impact) 
5,000 50 mph 
5,500 40 mph 
6,000 30 mph 
7,500 20 mph 
Table 2.   Road Traffic-Intensity Scale  
This table provides a rough guide to gauge road-traffic results.  Table 2 implies 
that when traffic intensities reach or exceed 5,000 persons, traffic congestion may 
become a problem.  (This happens in scenarios for the Anniston, Blue Grass, Pueblo, and 
Umatilla locations.)  However, much more study is needed on this topic and the 
discussion of results does not try to point out congested roads.   The terms “high-intensity 
traffic” and “medium-intensity traffic” will describe results, but these are only relative to 
other traffic intensities in the scenario.   
B. NEWPORT CHEMICAL DEPOT, INDIANA 
1. Parameters and Data Processing (Newport) 
For the Newport Chemical Depot, MINO defines an area roughly 60 miles wide 
(east to west) and 60 miles tall (from north to south).  The entire network model includes 
57,731 road segments, 8,360 population nodes encompassing 282,567 people, and 154 
emergency-response system locations. (Recall that these locations include hospitals, 
surgical facilities, EMS, fire stations, and ambulance providers.)  
NOAA historical wind data does not cover Newport, Indiana, so the wind data 
used in this test comes from the nearest cities for which NOAA data is available, 
Indianapolis, Columbus, and Springfield, Illinois.  Indianapolis is the nearest city, and the 
dominant prevailing wind there is southwest (SW) at 7-11 miles per hour (mph) (NOAA 
NCDC 1998).  Consequently that wind direction and speed is assumed for one scenario.  
Since the other two nearby cities both have a dominant prevailing south (S) wind at 7-13 
mph, a south wind is used for a second scenario.   
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The Newport Chemical Depot chemical catastrophes are centered at location 
39.854N, 87.431W.  Table 3 displays parameters used in HPAC to generate the two 
scenarios for this Depot. The construction type “bermed” refers to a concrete, reinforced 
bunker with a mound or earth barrier.    
 
HPAC Settings Level Winds Type 
Agent VX (Nerve) 1.  SW (225 degrees) @ 10 mph Prevailing 
Facility Type Storage Containers 2.  S (180 degrees) @ 10 mph  Prevailing 
Construction Bermed   
Weapon Size 500 lbs   
Table 3.    Newport Chemical Depot Scenario Parameters. 
Figure 11 shows the contamination areas calculated by HPAC for the two scenarios.  
For analysis, each contamination area is then approximated as an ellipse, and that ellipse 
is enlarged to create the “evacuation ellipse,” as described in Chapter III, Section C.  
(Figure 12 shows the two ellipses for the first scenario, and Figure 13 shows the ellipses 
for the second scenario.)    
 
Figure 11.   Newport Chemical Depot Chemical Catastrophes. 
Figures show contamination areas for two different scenarios. 
2. Analysis and Results (Newport) 
The first catastrophe scenario (SW wind at 10 mph) for Newport results in  
a large evacuation ellipse that covers 1,043 population nodes, totaling 23,471.   
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Figure 12 depicts the resulting MINOEVAC network with roads, contamination ellipse, 
evacuation area, and highlighted high-traffic roads.   
 
Figure 12.   Newport Chemical Depot Evacuation Result (Scen. 1: SW Wind) 
Key (for this and similar figures to follow): The incident location is the compass-
like icon in the lower left; the black lines represent road segments; the dashed 
ellipse is the contamination ellipse; and the red area/lines (inside the largest 
ellipse) highlight the evacuation area.  For MINOEVAC results:  the roads with high-
traffic intensity are bold white lines, and have arrows (or small ovals in other 
figures) indicating their locations with the calculated number of persons traveling 
out of the evacuation area at this locale.  The highlighted roads without arrows 
(yellow in a color reproduction, white in black-and-white) define the roads with 
medium-intensity traffic.  
With no major cities in the evacuation area and a rather dense road network, traffic 
levels are low along shortest-path routes, reaching a maximum of just 3,077 
persons on U.S. Highway 136.  Table 4 lists the resulting high-intensity traffic and 
medium-intensity traffic roads.  In addition to mapping the roads listed in Table 4, 
Figure 12 maps roads with medium-intensity traffic having intensity greater than 
400 persons per road. 
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High-Intensity Traffic Roads Medium-Intensity Traffic Roads 
Road Name Persons Road Name Persons 
U.S. Highway 136 
(W) 3077 Bunkertown 1165 
State Road 234 2290 Coffing Brothers 1165 
Waynetown (U.S. 
136) 2270 South County Line 1154 
State Road 32 2002 B 1130 
Bridge 1301 County Road 670 1041 
Canal 1301 Stringtown 1009 
County Road 550 1301 McGinty 1005 
Table 4.   Newport Road Traffic (Scenario 1:  SW wind, 10 mph) 
 
The evacuating population around Newport increases population numbers in a 
few safe locations, as highlighted in Figure 12.  These locations are likely areas for 
evacuees to pass through, or to stop and congregate, and measures should be taken to 
accommodate this.  These areas should also anticipate receiving evacuees who have been 
exposed to the relevant chemical agent.  The ability to treat and transport population 
outside of the evacuation area is examined next, using the two variants of the ERS model.   
The Newport area has a well-developed and dense emergency-response system 
network.  Results for the two ERS model variants show minimal changes in response 
distances for (members of the) population reaching a hospital, and for emergency 
responders reaching the population.  In other words, even though several emergency-
response system locations would be contaminated and become unusable, other safe ERS 
locations are close and could substitute.  The reader should note, however:   
Caveat 1. 
This ERS analysis does not take into account the capacity of the 
“substitute” hospitals or contingency plans for augmenting hospital care, 
and it is possible that some of these could be overwhelmed by needing to 
treat patients from a larger-than-normal area, in a situation with a large 
number of casualties.    
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The second scenario (S wind at 10 mph), creates another large area in which 
39,169 persons evacuate from 1,275 population nodes.  Although this is a worse 
evacuation scenario than the previous, results are similar; see Figure 13.    
 
 
Figure 13.   Newport Chemical Depot Evacuation Result (Scen. 2: S Wind) 
(The key in Figure 12 also applies to this figure.) No major cities fall within the 
evacuation area and the dense road network helps move traffic out of the 
evacuation area.  Traffic along the shortest-path routes reaches a maximum of 4,129 
persons on Madison Road, and at least 13,244 persons evacuate into the Danville 
area.  Table 5 lists the high-intensity and medium-intensity traffic.  In addition to 
mapping the roads listed in Table 5, Figure 13 maps roads with medium-intensity 
traffic having intensity greater than 800 persons per road.   
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High-Intensity Traffic Roads Medium-Intensity Traffic Roads 
Road Name Persons Road Name Persons 
Madison 4,129 Division 2,246 
Bowman Avenue 4,003 United States Highway 41 2,246 
U.S. Highway 136 3,832 Perrysville 2,118 
Plum 3,832 Old Covington 2,114 
River 3,024 I-74 2,103 
100 2,989 Cemetery 2,012 
Stone Bluff 2,878 4th 1,997 
Fairchild 2,834   
Table 5.   Newport Road Traffic (Scenario 2:  S wind, 10 mph) 
 
As in Scenario 1, the dense emergency-response system helps to reduce the 
impact to the local area from the Scenario-2 catastrophe.  Results from the ERS models 
show that only areas north and northeast of the evacuation area experience substantial 
increases in ERS distances; see Figure 14.   
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Figure 14.   Newport ERS Results, Scen. 2:  Hospitals (Left) and ER (Right). 
Key:  In MINOERS figures, legend numbers represent the increased distance in miles 
for hospital facilities and emergency-responders (ER) for a given area.  The 
contours result from mapping all population groups together.   
In Scenario 2, a few population locations just north and northeast of the evacuation 
area exhibit substantial increases in both hospital and ER distances.  For the 
hospital distances, the “distance-change scale” ranges from zero to greater than 25 
miles.   Population nodes in the red (dark) area would see travel distances increase 
over 25 miles to reach the nearest hospital.  The ER distance increases range from 
zero to greater than 15 miles.  Only a few areas north of the evacuation area see ER 
increases in excess of 12 miles.  (The reader is warned that some vulnerabilities 
may be artificially induced by MINO boundaries; see the discussion in the text.)    
Caveat 2. 
ERS distances for population nodes near a boundary edge may improve if other 
ERS locations exist just beyond the edges of that boundary.   In fact, inspection of 
actual ERS data north of the Newport MINO area shows additional hospital and 
ER locations that may negate the discussed vulnerabilities.  This will be the case 
for all CF MINOERS results along the edge of the model area.    
3. Summary (Newport) 
Few large cities are situated near the Newport Chemical Depot, and the Depot is 
surrounded by a robust road network and emergency-response system.  Using two 
scenarios with a container VX chemical catastrophe in prevailing wind conditions, 
evacuees ranged from 23,000 – 40,000 persons, which are spread nearly uniform across 
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multiple exit routes.  The traffic intensities reach a maximum of 4,100 persons on a single 
road, which suggests minimal traffic-congestion problems.  The safe population areas 
outside the evacuation area see little change in response distances to both hospitals and 
emergency-responders.   In Scenario 2, with a south wind, some population areas in the 
north do see increases in ERS distances.  This is the only potential vulnerability 
highlighted by the ERS models (but see Caveat 2).   
C. ANNISTON CHEMICAL ACTIVITY, ALABAMA 
1. Parameters and Data Processing (Anniston) 
For the Anniston Chemical Activity, the MINO area covers an area roughly 45 
miles wide and 60 miles tall.  The entire network includes 51,949 road segments, 6,358 
population nodes encompassing 299,599 people, and 130 emergency-response locations.   
NOAA historical wind data does not provide wind conditions at the Anniston 
location, so data from the nearest city, Birmingham, is used for the two scenarios 
investigated here.  The Birmingham prevailing wind directions are from the north (N) for 
nine out of twelve months and are south (S) for the remaining three months (NOAA 
NCDC 1998).  Wind speeds ranged from 6-9 mph.  The Anniston chemical catastrophes, 
centered at 33.68N, 85.963W, use the Birmingham wind data and following parameters 
in two different scenarios; see Table 6.  Figure 15 shows the two corresponding 
catastrophe-scenario results from HPAC.   
 
HPAC Settings Level Winds Type 
Agent VX (Nerve) 1.  N (360 degrees) @ 9 mph Prevailing 
Facility Type Weaponized VX 2.  S (180 degrees) @ 8 mph  Prevailing 
Construction Bermed   
Weapon Size 500 lbs   




Figure 15.   Anniston Chemical Activity Chemical Catastrophes 
Figures show contamination areas for two different scenarios. 
 
2. Analysis and Results (Anniston) 
The first scenario (N wind, 9 mph), generates a large evacuation area in which 
59,159 persons evacuate from 1,207 population nodes.  Figure 16 shows the resulting 
MINOEVAC network with roads, evacuation area, and highlighted high-traffic roads.  
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Figure 16.   Anniston Chemical Activity Evacuation Result (Scen. 1: N Wind) 
(The key in Figure 12 also applies to this figure.) The larger cities of Talladega 
and Oxford would evacuate creating a large amount of traffic in the southwest and 
northeast of the evacuation area, respectively.  The highest-intensity evacuation 
route heads southwest through Talladega; it carries 14,646 persons.  Table 7 lists 
the high-intensity traffic and medium-intensity traffic roads.  In addition to 
mapping the roads listed in Table 7, Figure 16 maps roads with medium-intensity 
traffic having intensity greater than 2,000 persons per road.     
 
High-Intensity Traffic Roads Medium-Intensity Traffic Roads 
Road Name Persons Road Name Persons 
Renfroe 14,646 Fort Lashley 5,813 
Mc Millan 11,381 Battle 5,543 
Coleman 10,494 South 5,449 
U.S. Highway 78 10,386 Alabama Highway 202 5,332 
Friendship 6,141 Clydesdale 5,332 
Jewell 6,141 Palmetto 5,332 
Table 7.   Anniston Road Traffic (Scenario 1:  N Wind, 9 mph) 
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The ERS surrounding Anniston, with 130 locations, has good, redundant coverage 
for the N-wind scenario, except to the southwest of the evacuation area.  Population 
groups there see a significant increase in ERS distances.  With a smaller number of 
hospitals compared to emergency-responders, more population areas see an increase in 
hospital distances; see Figure 17.  (And note Caveat 2.) 
 
  
Figure 17.   Anniston ERS Result, Scen. 1:  Hospitals (Left) and ER (Right) 
(The key in Figure 14 also applies to this figure.)  The hospital distances range up 
to 50 miles.  The red (dark) area southwest of the contamination area experiences a 
distance increase of over 50 miles.  A large green area west of that would also 
expect hospital distances to increase more than 20 miles.  The emergency-responder 
distances increase up to 50 miles with a similar distribution to the hospital results, 
but only in the red (dark) region.  
 
The second Anniston scenario (S wind, 8 mph), creates another large area in 
which 1,496 population nodes evacuate with 77,234 persons.  Figure 18 shows the 









Figure 18.   Anniston Chemical Activity Evacuation Result (Scen. 2: S Wind) 
(The key in Figure 12 also applies to this figure.) In this scenario, the primary 
evacuation routes lead through the city of Gadsden to the northwest and through 
Anniston and Weaver to the southeast.  The largest evacuation routes in the 
northwest carry over 30,000 persons out of the area.  Table 8 lists the high-intensity 
traffic and medium-intensity traffic roads.  In addition to mapping the roads listed 
in Table 8, Figure 18 maps roads with medium-intensity traffic having intensity 
greater than 2,000 persons per road.     
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High-Intensity Traffic Roads Medium-Intensity Traffic Roads 
Road Name Persons Road Name Persons 
Piedmont 11,019 Cole 3,913 
Sutton Bridge 11,019 U.S. Highway 278 3,897 
Church 8,089 Old Gadsden 3,879 
Highway 77 7,961 Parker 3,844 
Meighan 7,659 Mountain 3,726 
Walker 4,670 Forney 3,726 
Caddell 4,580 Main 3,722 
Blarney 4,575 2nd 3,564 
  Elmwood 3,551 
  Alabama Hwy 204 3,495 
Table 8.   Anniston Road Traffic (Scenario 2:  S Wind, 8 mph) 
 
The MINOERS1 model for the second scenario indicates that areas to the north will 
experience large travel-distance increases to reach a hospital (but see Caveat 2), and the 
results from MINOERS2 show that the emergency-responder distances increase only 
slightly; see Figure 19.    
 
  
Figure 19.   Anniston ERS Results, Scen. 2:  for Hospitals (Left) and ER (Right) 
The dark red areas, in the left half of Figure 19, will experience hospital distance 
increases greater than 10 miles.  The dense emergency-responder network shows 
little impact for population nodes after the catastrophe, with the greatest distance 
increase of only five miles for the small highlighted area straight west of the 
Anniston Chemical Activity.    
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3. Summary (Anniston) 
The area surrounding the Anniston Chemical Activity is similar to the Newport 
area in population size, but has a sparser road network and fewer ERS locations.  With a 
weaponized VX chemical catastrophe and prevailing wind conditions, the resulting 
evacuation areas require between 60,000 and 77,000 persons to evacuate.  In both 
scenarios, the evacuating population flows out of the area through two or three main 
traffic corridors.  In the north-wind scenario, the area west of Talladega and the areas 
around Anniston and Oxford see the greatest evacuation population numbers and, 
consequently, the greatest increase in traffic.  A few main roads in these areas show 
traffic exceeding 10,000 persons.  With a relatively robust ERS, the distances for 
hospitals and emergency-responders increase substantially only for a small area in the 
south, along the geographical boundary of MINO.  (See Caveat 2, however.)  
The south-wind scenario creates even more evacuating population with the area 
around Gadsden receiving the largest portion, over 30,000 persons.  Roads in the 
Gadsden area, as well as the Anniston and Weaver areas, see large amounts of traffic that 
may over-burden the road network.  Although several areas north of the evacuation area 
see small increase in ERS distances, the area may still require an augmentation of 
services given the somewhat-increased response times coupled with the large number of 
evacuees arriving to the area. (Again, see Caveat 2.) 
 
D. BLUE GRASS CHEMICAL ACTIVITY, KENTUCKY 
1. Parameters and Data Processing (Blue Grass) 
For the Blue Grass Chemical Activity, MINO defines an area roughly 50 miles 
wide and over 50 miles tall.  The entire network model includes 44,043 road segments, 
5,028 population nodes encompassing a large population of 495,004 people, and 150 
emergency-response system locations.  
The NOAA historical wind data does not provide data at the Richmond, Kentucky 
location, so the data used for this test comes from the nearest city of Lexington, Kentucky 
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just 20 miles to the northwest.  For Blue Grass, the single prevailing wind for Lexington 
was chosen for the first scenario.  A south (S) wind averaging 7-11 mph is prevalent all 
year-round for this part of Kentucky (NOAA NCDC 1998).  A second, worst-case 
scenario will examine a southeast (SE) wind which will directly affect the nearby city of 
Richmond.  
The Blue Grass Chemical Activity chemical catastrophes are centered at location 
37.72N, 84.215W.  Table 9 depicts the parameters utilized in the two different HPAC 
scenario runs.     
 
HPAC Settings Level Winds Type 
Agent GB (Nerve) 1.  S (180 degrees) @ 11 mph Prevailing 
Facility Type Weaponized 2.  SE (140 degrees) @ 11 mph  Worst Case 
Construction Bermed   
Weapon Size 1000 lbs   
Table 9.    Blue Grass Chemical Activity Scenario Parameters. 
Figure 20 shows the two catastrophe scenario results output from HPAC, with winds 
S and SE.   
 
Figure 20.   Blue Grass Chemical Activity Chemical Catastrophes 
Figures show contamination areas for two different scenarios. 
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2. Analysis and Results (Blue Grass) 
The first scenario (S wind at 11 mph), creates an evacuation area nearly ten miles 
long in which 36,434 persons evacuate from 349 population nodes.  Of note, a 
weaponized GB scenario generates a contamination ellipse less than 50 percent the size 
of an analogous VX scenario.  Figure 21 shows the resulting MINOEVAC network with 
roads, evacuation area, and highlighted high traffic roads. 
 
Figure 21.   Blue Grass Chemical Activity Evacuation Result (Scen. 1: S Wind) 
(The key in Figure 12 also applies to this figure.) The largest evacuation routes 
head southwest from the city of Richmond with over 20,000 evacuating persons.  
Table 10 lists the high-intensity traffic and medium-intensity traffic roads. In 
addition to mapping the roads listed in Table 10, Figure 21 maps roads with 
medium-intensity traffic having intensity greater than 900 persons per road.   
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High-Intensity Traffic Roads Medium-Intensity Traffic Roads 
Road Name Persons Road Name Persons 
Reynolds 12,695 Wellington 3,922 
Lancaster 12,635 3rd 3,716 
Elizabeth 12,635 Big Hill 2,604 
Cycle 7,725 Boggs 2,604 
Boggs 7,714 Steep 2,505 
  Eastern 2,452 
Table 10.   Blue Grass Road Traffic (Scenario 1:  S Wind, 11 mph) 
 
MINOERS1 shows that distances to hospitals increase significantly for areas just 
southwest of Richmond, see Figure 22.  (See Caveat 2.)  In MINOERS2, only a few 
population groups see distance increases, and those increases are all less than five miles; 
therefore the corresponding results figure is omitted. 
 
Figure 22.   Blue Grass ERS Result, Scen. 1:  Hospitals. 
The changes in hospital distance for the areas west and south of the Blue Grass 
evacuation area range from 6 to over 15 miles.  The center areas in orange (dark) 
are affected most, and would expect to see an increase of over 15 miles to the 
nearest hospital.   
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The second Blue Grass scenario (SE wind at 11 mph), creates a similar evacuation 
area with 366 population nodes evacuating 39,213 persons.   The resulting MINOEVAC 
network with roads, evacuation area, and highlighted high traffic roads can be seen in 
Figure 23.   
 
Figure 23.   Blue Grass Chemical Activity Evacuation Result (Scen. 2: SE Wind) 
(The key in Figure 12 also applies to this figure.) Traffic flows largely to the west 
out of Richmond with the Redwood and Tates Creek roads carrying over 20,000 
evacuating persons.  Table 11 lists the high-intensity traffic and medium-intensity 
traffic roads.  In addition to mapping the roads listed in Table 11, Figure 23 maps 
roads with medium-intensity traffic having intensity greater than 1,000 persons per 
road.       
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High-Intensity Traffic Roads Medium-Intensity Traffic Roads 
Road Name Persons Road Name Persons 
Redwood 16,068 Wellington 3,740 
Barnes Mill 16,068 McKee 3,734 
Eastern 14,597 General Nelson 3,734 
Lancaster 8,569 3rd 3,534 
Tates Creek 5,977 Berea 3,206 
Old Ky 52 4,853 Wildcat 2,287 
Irvine 4,209 Park 2,253 
  State Highway 52 2,246 
  Kit Carson 2,208 
  Big Hill 2,204 
Table 11.   Blue Grass Road Traffic (Scenario 2:  SE Wind, 11 mph) 
 
In Scenario 2, both the distances to hospitals and emergency-responders are 
affected, see Figure 24.   The MINOERS1 Scenario 2 results nearly duplicate the results 
from Scenario 1, which is not all that surprising given the small change in wind direction 
(40 degrees).  Unlike Scenario 1, MINOERS2 does identify areas that are impacted by the 
loss of emergency responders.  (Caveat 2 applies to the discussion above.) 
 
  
Figure 24.   Blue Grass ERS Result, Scen. 2:  Hospitals (Left) and ER (Right) 
The results and distance-change scale for hospitals is nearly identical to Scenario 1.  
For the changes in hospital distance, the areas in orange and red (dark) see an 
increase of over 15 miles.  For emergency responders, the orange and red area 
northeast of Blue Grass shows a distance increase over five miles. 
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3. Summary (Blue Grass) 
The Blue Grass Chemical Activity MINO includes a population of over 495,000 
persons.  Fortunately, the weaponized GB chemical catastrophe scenarios, using the 
prevailing wind condition and a worst-case wind condition, not spark mass evacuations.  
Fewer than 40,000 persons evacuate in each scenario.  In the first scenario, with a south 
wind, a few roads southwest of the Richmond area see significant traffic, with over 
12,000 persons.  This area also becomes the primary departure point for the nearly two-
thirds of the evacuating population.  Additionally, with no hospital facilities available in 
this area southwest of Richmond, hospital distances increase considerably, (See Caveat 
2.)   
Similar results follow for a second, worst-case scenario as the majority of 
evacuating population departs west out of Richmond.  Again, a few roads carry large 
numbers of persons, with up to 16,000 persons on the main roadway.  Hospital distances 
increase as in the first scenario because the area west of Richmond has limited hospital 
facility infrastructure.  (See Caveat 2.)  Overall, given the likely south wind for the Blue 
Grass area, the road network and ERS appear vulnerable and may quickly reach capacity 
in the areas south and west of Richmond.   
E. PUEBLO CHEMICAL DEPOT, COLORADO 
1. Parameters and Data Processing (Pueblo) 
For the Pueblo Chemical Depot, MINO defines an area roughly 60 miles wide and 
50 miles tall.  The combined network includes 20,372 road segments, 3,015 population 
nodes, and 31 emergency-response system locations.  The model population includes 
145,799 people.   
The NOAA historical wind data establishes two prevailing wind conditions for 
Pueblo.  For two months, January and February, the prevailing wind is from the west (W) 
from 7-8 mph, and for the other ten months, the prevailing winds are from the east-south-
east (ESE) at 7-11 mph (NOAA NCDC 1998).   
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The Pueblo chemical catastrophes are centered at location 38.345N, 104.32W.  
Initial results from MINOEVAC and MINOERS show that the two prevailing wind 
directions have little impact on the local infrastructure so a third more devastating wind 
direction of east-north-east (ENE) is added for analysis.  Table 12 displays the parameters 
utilized in the three different HPAC scenarios run for the Pueblo area. 
 
HPAC Settings Level Winds Type 
Agent HD (Mustard) 1.  ESE (115 degrees) @ 11 mph Prevailing 
Facility Type Weaponized 2.  W (270 degrees) @ 9 mph  Prevailing 
Construction Light Steel 3.  ENE (060 degrees) @ 10 mph Worst Case 
Weapon Size 500 lbs   
Table 12.    Pueblo Chemical Depot Scenario Parameters. 
 
A few of the levels for Pueblo HPAC settings are altered to create worse-than-
likely scenarios for analysis.  One setting with a large impact to contamination area is the 
type of bunker or storage-facility construction.  Most of the chemical weapons stored at 
the Pueblo Chemical Depot are housed in bermed, concrete bunkers.  With mustard agent 
and bermed bunkers chosen in HPAC, the resulting contamination area would remain 
within the confines of the military installation.  While this is a comforting result, these 
parameters were relaxed to test the Pueblo MINO.  A more severe case assuming only 
steel construction housing the chemical weapons is utilized for the scenario calculations.  
Although less likely, this situation could occur during transport of a chemical weapon or 
in a destruction facility.  
Figure 25 shows the three results from HPAC, with winds ESE, W, and ENE from 
left to right respectively.   
 55
 
Figure 25.   Pueblo Chemical Depot Chemical Catastrophes 
Figures show contamination areas for three different scenarios. 
 
2. Analysis and Results (Pueblo) 
As alluded to earlier, the first two wind directions, ESE and W prevailing winds, 
do not produce significant effects on the local infrastructure.  Even with the expanded 
evacuation area, the number of evacuees remain below 200 persons and there is virtually 
no impact to the emergency-response system.  Therefore, for prevailing wind directions 
and speeds, a major weaponized mustard-agent catastrophe starting inside a light steel 
building, has little impact to public safety, in general.  To test vulnerabilities in the area, a 
third scenario with a more problematic wind direction is created.     
In Scenario 3 (ENE wind at 10 mph), 2,289 locations with 123,752 people 




Figure 26.   Pueblo Chemical Depot Evacuation Result (Scen. 3:  ENE Wind) 
(The key in Figure 12 also applies to this figure.) The population in this scenario 
will likely pool north of the city or continue further north out of the area.   The 
areas north of Pueblo see an increase of over 106,000 persons, or over 85 percent of 
those evacuating.  The remainder of the evacuees flow out to the southeast and east 
of the evacuation area.  Table 13 lists the roads with the largest traffic intensities.      
 
High-Intensity Traffic Roads Medium-Intensity Traffic Roads 
Road Name Persons Road Name Persons 
Boyero 64,098 Collins 13,546 
Wildhorse 64,002 Wooden 11,311 
Pueblo 57,174 Adams 11,262 
Overton 42,157 Veta 10,814 
Jerry Murphy 40,195 Princeton 9,663 
Goodnight 17,419 29th 8,245 
Table 13.   Pueblo Road Traffic (Scenario 3: ENE Wind, 10 mph) 
 
MINOERS for Scenario 3 shows that all of the hospital facilities in the study area fall 
within the evacuation area and become unusable.  In this worst case, the facilities needed 
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to treat any casualties (or unrelated injuries and disease) must lie outside the MINO area.  
However, the Pueblo area contains more emergency-responder locations and some lie 
outside the evacuation area, so it does make sense to analyze changes in ER distances 
with MINOERS2; Figure 27 displays those results. 
 
 
Figure 27.   Pueblo ERS Result, Scen. 3:  ER 
For areas southeast of the evacuation area, emergency-responder distances increase 
significantly, with a few areas in the orange (darker) contours increasing up to 100 
miles.  All areas southeast of the contamination area see emergency-responder 
distance increases of over 60 miles, and should expect response times to increase 
accordingly (See Caveat 2.)   
3. Summary (Pueblo) 
The area surrounding the Pueblo Chemical Depot has a sparse road network, a 
relatively small population, and few emergency-response locations.  Fortunately, the 
chemical agent stored in the Depot, HD mustard, is the least dangerous of those studied 
here, and is unlikely to produce a true chemical catastrophe.  To test the Pueblo MINO, 
HPAC parameters must be relaxed to create a scenario in which chemical agents actually 
disperse beyond the borders of the military installation.  With the two prevailing wind 
conditions, given a weaponized mustard agent chemical catastrophe, the expanded 
evacuation areas contain fewer than 200 persons and have virtually no impact to the ERS.  
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Overall, the results show no significant vulnerabilities for standard conditions in the 
Pueblo area.  However, to test MINO and identify potential vulnerabilities, a worst-case 
wind direction is chosen next with an ENE wind, a direction that directly affects the city 
of Pueblo.  
The entire city of Pueblo lies within the evacuation area, and so a large volume of 
traffic evacuates the area to the north towards Colorado Springs.  Over 106,000 persons, 
about 85 percent of all the evacuees, travel along these roads.  The main roads and areas 
just north of Pueblo would be impacted significantly with the added evacuation 
population.  Additionally, all the hospital facilities in the study area fall inside the 
evacuation area and are deemed unusable.  Hospital facilities outside the model area 
would be required, or mobile facilities could be brought into the region.  While the areas 
north of Pueblo do not see major increases to the emergency-responder distances, the 
areas east of Pueblo show significant distance increases because only a few emergency-
responder locations remain.  The city of Pueblo, its infrastructure and population, appears 
to be highly vulnerable to a worst-case chemical catastrophe.  (However, see Caveat 2 
and recall that the scenario assumptions here are extreme.)  
F. DESERET CHEMICAL DEPOT, UTAH 
1. Parameters and Data Processing (Deseret) 
For the Deseret Chemical Depot, MINO defines an area roughly 40 miles wide 
and 40 miles tall.  With the large metropolis of Salt Lake City within this area, MINO 
must be scaled back in an attempt to stay within the limitations of the software.  (As 
stated earlier, a different implementation could accommodate this much larger road 
network and population.)  The minimum population node size is increased to 40 persons 
to reduce the number of population nodes.  To increase space for road arcs, population 
nodes and ERS nodes are connected to the road network using only one arc, rather than 
the standard two.  The reduced network includes 52,499 road segments, 8,142 population 
nodes, and 231 emergency-response system locations.  The model population includes 
954,607 people.   
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NOAA historical wind data establish two prevailing wind conditions for Salt Lake 
City, which lies about 25 miles to the northeast of CF.  For two thirds of the year, the 
prevailing winds are out of the south-southeast (SSE) at 8-10 mph, and the remainder of 
the year the wind is out of the southeast (SE) at the same speeds (NOAA NCDC 1998).  
With the prevailing winds from nearly the same direction, which also coincides with a 
worst-case Salt Lake City event, the analysis of only one scenario is attempted here. 
The Deseret chemical catastrophe is centered at location 40.308N, 112.358W.  
Table 14 depicts the parameters utilized in the Deseret Chemical Depot HPAC scenario.  
 
HPAC Settings Level Winds Type 
Agent VX (Nerve) 1.  SE (215 degrees) @ 10 mph Prevailing 
Facility Type Storage   
Construction Bermed   
Weapon Size 750 lbs   
Table 14.    Deseret Chemical Depot Scenario Parameters. 
2. Analysis and Results (Deseret) 
Given the large contamination area created by the HPAC scenario, and given the 
high density of population and roads in the Salt Lake City area, MINOG  for this area is 
simply too large to handle within the Excel format and MINO.  Consequently, no 
summary or further analysis is provided in this thesis for the Deseret Chemical Depot.  
This large, population-dense area could be addressed in future work. 
G. UMATILLA CHEMICAL DEPOT, OREGON 
1. Parameters and Data Processing (Umatilla) 
For the Umatilla Chemical Depot, MINO defines an area roughly 75 miles wide 
and 75 miles tall.  The complete network includes 43,700 road segments, 5,476 
population nodes encompassing 290,589 people, and 135 emergency-response system 
locations. 
 60
NOAA historical wind data establishes two prevailing wind conditions for 
Pendleton, Oregon, a location 30 miles to the east of the Umatilla area.  For two thirds of 
the year, the prevailing wind is from the west (W) at 7-9 mph, and is from the SSE in the 
same speed range for the remainder of the year (NOAA NCDC 1998).   
The Umatilla chemical catastrophes are centered at location 45.85N, 119.425W.  
Table 15 displays parameters used in HPAC to generate the two scenarios for this Depot.  
One prevailing-wind-direction scenario is selected along with a worst-case scenario 
which impacts the larger city of Kennewick, Washington, to the northeast of the CF. 
 
HPAC Settings Level Winds Type 
Agent GB (Nerve) 1.  W (270 degrees) @ 9 mph Prevailing 
Facility Type Storage Containers 2.  SSW (205 degrees) @ 9 mph  Worst Case 
Construction Bermed   
Weapon Size 750 lbs   
Table 15.    Umatilla Chemical Depot Scenario Parameters. 
 
Figure 28 shows the two results from HPAC, with winds W and SSW on the left and 
right respectively.   
 
Figure 28.   Umatilla Chemical Depot Chemical Catastrophes 
Figures show contamination areas for three different scenarios. 
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2. Analysis and Results (Umatilla) 
Scenario 1 (W wind at 9 mph), creates an evacuation area stretching nearly 40 
miles long in which 30,921 persons from 658 population nodes require evacuation.  The 
resulting MINOEVAC network with roads, evacuation area, and highlighted high-traffic 
roads can be seen in Figure 29.   
 
Figure 29.   Umatilla Chemical Depot Evacuation Result (Scen. 1: W Wind) 
(The key in Figure 12 also applies to this figure.) The most heavily used evacuation 
routes head north across the Interstate 82 bridge spanning the Columbia River.  
Table 16 lists the high-intensity traffic and medium-intensity traffic roads.  In 
addition to mapping the roads listed in Table 16, Figure 29 maps roads with 
medium-intensity traffic having intensity greater than 3,000 persons per road.   
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High-Intensity Traffic Roads Medium-Intensity Traffic Roads 
Road Name Persons Road Name Persons 
I-82 15,774 Jones Scott 8,122 
Plymouth 15,774 Umatilla-Stanfield 8,083 
Brownell 15,713 Madison Sayler 7,465 
6th 11,663 Colonal Jordan 7,465 
  Westland 7,035 
  Bridge 6,655 
Table 16.   Umatilla Road Traffic (Scenario 1:  W Wind, 9 mph) 
 
Although there are 135 ERS locations in the Umatilla MINOERS, the lack of roads 
crossing the Columbia River and contamination of larger cities can greatly impact the 
ERS; see Figure 30.    
 
  
Figure 30.   Umatilla ERS Result, Scen. 1:  Hospitals (Left), ER (Right). 
In this first scenario, hospital distances increase in excess of 25 miles for areas in 
red and orange (dark center) west of the chemical catastrophe.  An even larger area 
of population, in yellow and greens (outer edges), will see distance increases 
greater than 15 miles to the nearest hospital.  The emergency-responders are less 
impacted with the greatest distance increase just over six miles.  Although there are 
several large areas in the ER figure, the increase in distances for emergency-
responders is not as significant as seen with hospitals.   
 
 63
The second scenario (SSW wind at 9 mph), generates another large contamination 
area stretching into the town of Kennewick, Washington.  A much larger population falls 
within the evacuation area where 1,995 population nodes encompassing 127,935 persons 
must evacuate.  Figure 31 displays the resulting MINOEVAC network with roads, 
evacuation area, and highlighted high-traffic roads. 
 
 
Figure 31.   Umatilla Chemical Depot Evacuation Result (Scen. 2:  SSW Wind) 
(The key in Figure 12 also applies to this figure.) The most heavily used evacuation 
routes are depicted, exiting the city of Kennewick to the east, and west to Richland.  
As the figure shows, nearly 100,000 persons must evacuate the Kennewick area 
creating a significant traffic problem.  Table 17 lists the high-intensity traffic and 
medium-intensity traffic roads.  In addition to mapping the roads listed in Table 17, 
Figure 31 maps roads with medium-intensity traffic having intensity greater than 
5,000 persons per road.   
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High-Intensity Traffic Roads Medium-Intensity Traffic Roads 
Road Name Persons Road Name Persons 
10th  20,474 George Washington 13,155 
Chemical 20,444 State Highway 240 13,155 
19th 20,444 Carmichael 11,628 
Yew 20,444 Kennewick 11,340 
7th 18,123 Highway 395 10,233 
3rd 17,731 25th 7,363 
Oak 17,731 27th 7,253 
Gum 16,804 Columbia Center 5,706 
1st 16,783 Steptoe 5,639 
Vineyard 16,362 Orchard 5,575 
Table 17.   Umatilla Road Traffic (Scenario 2:  SSW Wind, 9 mph) 
Since the model only moves evacuees to the edge of the evacuation area, we 
would presume evacuees traveling east from Kennewick would have adequate bridge 
capacity to travel across the Columbia River.  According to the MINOEVAC road data, 
those specific evacuees would be stranded, as no safe bridges exist across the Columbia 
outside the evacuation area.  Therefore, evacuees would more likely travel longer 
distances through the evacuation area across the bridges in Kennewick or to the west.  In 
other words, evacuees would follow longer paths that would tend to increase their risk of 
exposure to the chemical agent.     
As noted earlier, a portion of population east of the contaminated area will be 
isolated, without safe travel routes.  Hospital distances are impacted significantly in this 
scenario, as highlighted by MINOERS1; see Figure 32.   Some emergency-responders are 
located within the isolated area as well as in other areas, and this means that emergency-




Figure 32.   Umatilla ERS Result, Scenario 2: Hospitals 
Of the 11 ERS hospital locations, none of the hospitals fall within this red (dark) 
isolated area bounded by the evacuation area and the Columbia River.  Therefore, 
the isolated population cannot reach a hospital using the road network.  Alternate 
means via the river or air would be required to move further from the evacuation 
area without reentering and risking exposure.  Another large number of population 
groups would see hospital distances increase over 30 miles, depicted by the green 
areas southwest of the Umatilla Chemical Depot.   
3. Summary (Umatilla) 
The Umatilla Chemical Depot area studied roughly 5,600 square miles of Oregon 
and Washington, the largest of the MINO areas.  With a GB storage facility chemical 
catastrophe, two vastly different scenarios result, depending solely on differing wind 
directions.  The prevailing westerly wind generates a large evacuation area, but only 
requires evacuation of 31,000 persons.  The majority of those persons cross the Columbia 
River in their shortest path, highlighting the importance of the Interstate 82 bridge.  With 
the contamination of the ERS locations east of Umatilla, population groups west of the 
evacuation area would see a large distance increase, greater than 15-30 miles, to the 
nearest hospital. (See Caveat 2.)   
 The worst-case wind scenario creates a large evacuation area stretching into the 
town of Kennewick, Washington.  In this case, over 127,000 persons require evacuation.  
This evacuation creates high traffic volumes on numerous roadways, especially in the 
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Kennewick area, but also in the Richland and Hermiston areas.  These areas could expect 
to see large increases in population with the possibility of large numbers of exposed 
persons.  Results from MINOEVAC isolate a large portion of the evacuating population 
between the evacuation area and the Columbia River.  This fact may be viewed as a 
model limitation, as a logical evacuation plan would require evacuees to follow longer 
routes within the evacuation area to reach safe areas that are not isolated.  Nevertheless, 
for any isolated population group, an alternate transportation system to transit from the 
isolated area may be necessary, e.g., watercraft on the river.  The hospital distances 
increase for several areas surrounding the evacuation area.  With several bridges 
unusable, this situation would also require alternate transportation solutions.   
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
This thesis has created a model called MINO (multi-infrastructure network 
operations model) to identify vulnerabilities in select infrastructure systems to the release 
of a chemical-weapons agent.  MINO is applied to the road networks, emergency-
response systems, and public-health systems in the areas surrounding each of five U.S. 
Chemical Warfare Stockpiles and Facilities (CFs).  Each CF is subjected to several 
hypothetical “chemical-catastrophe scenarios,” and variants of MINO (1) identify roads 
that are likely to become congested during the evacuation that must take place, (2) 
identify areas in the “safe zone” (outside the evacuation zone) that will need to 
accommodate large numbers of evacuees (3) identify safe-zone areas in which 
emergency-response times will increase, and (4) identify safe-zone areas in which the 
population will experience a significant increase in the time required to reach a hospital.  
MINO first creates a generic network model that integrates representations of the 
local road network, population blocks, emergency-response services and public-health 
facilities.  Chemical-catastrophe scenarios are generated by specifying a variety of 
parameters (e.g., wind speed, wind direction, chemical type) for the Hazard Prediction 
and Assessment Capability software (HPAC) currently in use by the Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency (DTRA).  The output is a “contamination area,” which is expanded 
with a buffer zone to define an “evacuation area.” The local population must leave the 
evacuation area immediately, after which all roads in that area are declared unusable.  
Variants of the MINO network and shortest-path techniques are then used to address 
items (1)-(4) listed above. 
The models are written in Microsoft Excel’s Visual Basic for Applications 
(VBA), because Excel is widely accessible and used in the Department of Defense.  
Google Earth software helps visualize MINO and interpret MINO results.   
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Results from MINO highlight vulnerabilities in the road and emergency-response 
system (ERS) infrastructures.  This should inform emergency planners as to where 
infrastructure deficiencies may exist and help guide improvements.     
B. CONCLUSIONS AND KEY INSIGHTS 
As a caveat, the reader should note that only a few hypothetical scenarios have 
been analyzed for each location, and these scenarios represent only a small fraction those 
possible.  Therefore, the results from this thesis should not be considered definitive.  
Furthermore, results for a single CF can vary widely depending on scenario parameters.  
For instance, the two scenarios investigated for the Umatilla Chemical Depot in Oregon 
show a difference of 100,000 in the number of evacuees (starting from a total population 
of 290,589).      
The algorithms used in MINO run quickly.  With a well-developed MINO 
network model, a range of scenarios could be analyzed, vulnerabilities identified and 
those results cataloged as an on-the-shelf reference for contingency planners and 
emergency responders.   
The MINO evacuation model can identify main road corridors used in an 
evacuation, and safe areas in which evacuees may congregate. This information can be 
used to help design better evacuation routes, give emergency responders an 
understanding of where traffic intensities may affect their response, and will also assist in 
implementing traffic-control measures.  The MINO ERS model helps emergency 
responders and planners identify areas that may require special attention, such as 
assistance from outside sources.      
C. FOLLOW-ON WORK 
The development of MINO introduces an example of multi-infrastructure 
networks and systems analysis.  From the macro perspective, the next step should 
consider integrating other infrastructure systems into the MINO model.  Other 
infrastructure systems, such as water systems or agriculture, may have similarities which  
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would lend to reuse of the existing contamination logic and evacuation model (or modest 
modifications, thereof).  Other infrastructure systems, e.g., a local electric power grid, 
may require substantially different models.  
Several aspects of the current MINO models should be developed further.  First, 
adding weights to roads based on road capacity would create more realistic evacuation 
routes as evacuees are more likely to use higher-capacity roads and highways rather than 
low-capacity side streets.  A similar modification could address casualty capacities for 
the ERS, e.g., the size of hospital facilities and load capacity for emergency responders.  
Second, software changes are needed to handle larger network models, and thus 
larger geographical regions.  With the current implementation in Excel 2003, the 
maximum number of spreadsheet rows limits the network size, which is a function of the 
number of roads, population nodes, etc.  For instance, the current MINO implementation 
cannot analyze the region surrounding the Deseret Chemical Depot near Salt Lake City, 
because of the dense road network and large population.   
Third, a few steps in the modeling-and-analysis process require manual 
intervention from the user, and these should be automated.  For instance, the 
approximation of the contamination area by an ellipse requires data imports and manual 
point selection.  Further study should verify the validity of the elliptical contamination-
area approximation.  Integrating several manual steps and consolidating other 
disconnected steps into a single function could further simplify model processing and 
improve efficiency.  For example, the following manual steps could be fully automated in 
a single process:  the data for the HPAC-generated contamination area is manually 
transferred into Excel; the user then applies that data, in a partially manual process to 
generate the evacuation ellipse; and then a separate application makes structural changes 
to the MINO network to reflect the imposition of the evacuation area. 
Fourth, with improved, automated data processing, a smart design of experiment 
could investigate a large range of values for wind speed, wind direction and other 
parameters.  Generating a wider range of scenarios would help identify vulnerabilities  
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that are most likely to be problematic.  Ultimately, the study of multi-infrastructure 




APPENDIX A:  HPAC 
The following selection, provides a brief introduction to the HPAC software used in this 
these, was taken from the HPAC 4.04 Users Manual (DTRA 2004).   
Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability (HPAC) is a counter proliferation, 
counterforce tool that predicts the effects of hazardous material releases into the 
atmosphere and its [sic] collateral effects on civilian and military populations. HPAC 
assists warfighters in destroying targets containing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
and responding to hazardous agent releases. It employs integrated source terms, high-
resolution weather forecasts and particulate transport algorithms to rapidly model hazard 
areas and human collateral effects. HPAC estimates the NBC hazards associated with 
releases from either facilities or weapons. 
HPAC predicts NBC hazards from incidents such as the following: 
• Nuclear Facility Accidents (Chernobyl, Ukraine) 
• Nuclear Weapon Explosions (Hiroshima, Japan) 
• Nuclear Weapon Incident/Accident, “Broken Arrow” (Palomares, Spain) 
• Radiological Weapon Incident 
• Chemical Facility Damage (Bhopal, India) 
• Biological Facility Damage (Sverdlovsk, Russia) 
• Chemical Weapons (Kamasiyha, Iraq) 
• Biological Weapons (Yokosuka, Japan (alleged use by Aum Shin Rikyo)) 
 
HPAC was designed to be used by two types of users, operational and analytical: 
• Operational users include pilots, soldiers, and commanders – in other words, 
field users responding to actual or expected events. 
• Analytical users (analysts) generally are involved in research and development. 
HPAC generally includes default values for user inputs in order to simplify complex 
input for operational users. Analytical users may change these default inputs based on 
their subject matter expertise. 
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APPENDIX B:  CREATING THE MINO 
A. BACKGROUND 
The following Appendix expands on Chapter III, Section A, constructing the 
multi-infrastructure network operations model (MINO) for a given U.S. Chemical 
Warfare Stockpile and Facility (CF), represented by the undirected network graph MINOG .  
The required critical-infrastructure data is extracted from various datasets and then 
merged, using a common reference system:  latitude and longitude (lat/long) coordinates.  
The construction process first defines the road-network infrastructure and then integrates 
the emergency-response system (ERS) infrastructure, which includes the hospitals and 
first responders.  Population must also be represented and connected to the road network.   
The goal is to build a connected, undirected road, population, and emergency-
response system network of nodes and arcs in Microsoft Excel using data-processing 
routines written in Visual Basic for Applications (VBA).  All initial data files are 
specified in a shapefile (.shp) format (ESRI 1998).  While a shapefile can be read by 
ESRI’s ArcMap program, it does not easily convert into a traditional network dataset.  
Several different transformations are required to convert the shapefile data files into a 
useful form (University of Texas 2004). 
B. ROAD NETWORK DEVELOPMENT 
Road and population data are taken from the 2000 Census TIGER database 
(Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing database) available to 
the public through the ESRI GIS and Mapping Software Web site (ESRI 2007).  The 
TIGER database is downloadable by county and data type, e.g. “Census Blocks 2000” 
and “Line Features – Roads”.  After downloading county road data for a given CF area 
from the TIGER database, the county sets are merged into a single shapefile for further 
processing using GeoMerge (VDS Technologies 2007).  The software tool GeoMerge, a 
free utility available on the Internet, easily and quickly combines the county shapefiles 
into one large dataset.  The road dataset is then filtered by lat/long in ArcMap using the 
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Selection Features tool to shrink the working file and ensure a maximum of 65,535 road 
segments, an Excel 2003 software limitation (Walkenbach 2004).  This segment limit is 
imposed by the road-processing algorithm.  This limitation could be overcome with a 
different implementation (using multiple spreadsheets and combining the data using 
VBA) or Excel 2007.  With the newly filtered area in ArcMap, the selected layer is 
exported as a new road shapefile. 
The road data shapefiles contain data based on shapes.  To convert the shapefiles 
into a set of line segments a data transformation is necessary.  The FWTools toolset first 
converts the road shapefile into a more usable MapInfo Interchange Format (.mif) 
(Warmerdam 2007).  The MapInfo result contains the road segments, each segment 
described by several points.  These road segments represent a portion of the road with no 
intersections and the points follow the actual curve of the segment.   Only the first and 
last points are kept by MINO as nodes with a corresponding road arc.  
Additional data required for each road arc is available in the road shapefile and 
can be accessed using the ArcMap Attribute Table for the specific shapefile.  The length 
of each road segment is extracted, as well as other data including the name of the road, 
e.g. County Road A10, and type of road, e.g. A5 – Vehicular Trail.  The road name is 
informative for final analysis, and the road type is needed because certain roads cannot be 
used by normal vehicles.  In particular, a road designated as A5, “Vehicular Trail” is 
usable only by four-wheel drive vehicles, and A7, “Road as Other Thoroughfare” is 
usable only by bicyclists or pedestrians: these read types are deemed unusable in MINO 
and omitted (U.S. Census Bureau 2001).  For further Excel VBA processing, the 
shapefile’s Attribute Table is exported and saved in dBase format (.dbf).    
A VBA algorithm then processes the MapInfo file and dBase Attribute Table to 
create the road arc list by start node, end node, distance, road name, and road type.  To 
further confine the road data to the working area and keep the dataset as small as 
possible, the road data is more accurately filtered by lat/long.  Another filter also deletes 
any road of type A5 or A7.  The resulting road-arc dataset contains essentially one-way 
only roads.  To ensure traffic can flow either way on the road arcs, all roads are assumed 
to be two-way and a “reversed” copy of the arcs is added to the network during model 
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processing. (Internally, MINO uses a directed graph representation of the road network so 
every undirected arc ( , )i j  in MINOG must be represented by the directed arcs 
( , ) and ( , )i j j i .)  A final road node list from the arc set is also maintained for connecting 
nodes that will represent population or ERS locations.    
C. POPULATION MAPPING 
Next, the human population is modeled and connected to the road network.  From 
the TIGER database, census population data is provided for small geographical areas, 
referred to as “blocks.”  Downloading census block data requires the same process used 
for the road network: select counties and merge the county shapefiles into a single 
shapefile.  Again, using ArcMap the census data is filtered by the Select Features tool.  
Since the population-processing algorithms place no restriction on the number of Census 
blocks in the final shapefile, the lat/long filtering can be done with a VBA filter (instead 
of using ArcMap).    
Unlike the road network, the edges of the block shape cannot be transformed 
directly into a population network.  Each block is represented by a node placed at the 
block’s center with all population in the block assigned to that “population node.”  The 
shape’s edge lat/long points are averaged to define a central population node that lies 
within the shape.   
Creating population nodes follows the same initial steps as the road-network 
construction process.  The merged shapefile for population census blocks is transformed 
into a MapInfo file.  The MapInfo file is imported into Excel, processed, and averaged to 
create a set of population nodes.  The actual population (number of people in a block 
shape) is captured by joining the demographic data with the merged shapefile’s Attribute 
Table.  The population data is copied in with the set of population nodes and the 
combined population set is filtered again.  Some blocks contain no population, so nodes 
are not created for these.  Nodes are also more accurately filtered by lat/long using a 
VBA algorithm.  Next, population nodes containing five or fewer people are paired with 
neighboring, larger population nodes to reduce the total number of MINO nodes.  This 
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“neighbor-population filter” reduces the number of population nodes by about ten 
percent.   
Finally, the remaining set of population nodes must be connected to the road 
network.  A search procedure finds the two closest road nodes, from the road node list, 
and arcs are created to these two nodes.  To ensure these artificial arcs are not used to 
transit the network, other than to get the population on the road network or emergency 
responders to the population, a large distance penalty, C , is assigned to each one.  The 
penalty C  was chosen to be larger than any possible route within the MINO area.  For all 
MINOs, 100.C =  
D. EMERGENCY RESPONSE SYSTEM (ERS) 
The ERS infrastructure data is provided by the National Geospatial-Intelligence 
Agency (NGA) from the Homeland Security Infrastructure Program database (“HSIP”; 
see NGA 2007).  From the ERS data, locations are selected for two different ERS 
categories in a CF area.  The emergency-responder (ER) category includes Emergency 
Medical Services (EMS), fire stations, and ambulance providers.  The other category, 
referred to as “hospitals” here, actually includes hospitals and ambulatory surgical 
facilities.  
These ERS data are provided as point shapefiles and locations are easily 
converted into nodes for MINO.  For model simplicity, static locations are assumed for 
emergency-responders such as ambulance providers, which may normally preposition.  
As with population nodes, arcs are created to ensure these services and facilities connect 





APPENDIX C:  GOOGLE EARTH NETWORK DISPLAY 
A method to graphical depict the multi-infrastructure network operations model 
(MINO) is necessary to visually examine for accuracy and create results.  At this point, 
then Google Earth (GE) is the solution.  While ArcMap is useful to display initial 
shapefiles (ESRI 1998), after creating a MINO in Microsoft Excel with a standard arc set 
and node list, the MINO network cannot easily translate back into shapefile format for 
ArcMap display.  Furthermore, ArcMap is not readily available for most DoD facilities 
and a more portable solution is desirable.  Google Earth provides a simple solution.  It 
encompasses an open-source set of tools than can quickly convert a standard network 
dataset of arcs and nodes into a useful graphical depiction.  GE’s built-in maps and other 
data provide a background image to correlate MINO to the actual geographic area and 
infrastructure. 
Google Earth can display lines and points from a Keyhole Markup Language 
(KML) formatted whose format is similar to the more common Extensible Markup 
Language (XML).  Generating a KML file from Excel requires a VBA macro to generate 
either arcs as lines or nodes as icons.  The KML format is outlined in detail at the 
following Web site:  http://code.google.com/apis/kml/documentation/index.html. 
Node-name strings in MINO contain the node’s latitude and longitude (lat/long) 
position in the network.  For example, a road intersection or population group could be 
represented as the node string:  “38.036284 -84.674312”.  With a single space between 
the two coordinates, Excel functions parse the latitude and longitude double-precision 
numerical values from the node name.  The lat/long data along with the KML formatting 
create a file that GE can display.  The following example, which results from processing 
that data for GE (Figure 33,) shows arc data in Excel and the KML file. 
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Figure 33.   Google Earth Arc-to-KML Example. 
In this figure, the nodes on the left represent two road arcs, each described with a 
“tail node” and “head node,” in the MINO network.  The VBA macro creates the 
KML arc file which can be displayed in Google Earth.  The right column of the 
figure shows the actual KML generated for the two specific arcs on the left.   
Figure 34 shows the VBA code that creates a KML file for MINO nodes, and Figure 35 
shows the VBA code that creates a KML arc file.    
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Sub Nodes2KML() 
    Dim rNodes As Range, FN As Integer, i As Long, j As Long 
    Dim dLat As Double, dLong As Double 
    Set rNodes = ActiveSheet.Range("I2", ActiveSheet.Range("I2").End(xlDown).End(xlToRight)) 
    ChDrive Left$(ActiveWorkbook.path, 1) 
    ChDir ActiveWorkbook.path 
    FN = FreeFile() 
    Open "nodes.kml" For Output As FN 
    Print #FN, "<?xml version=""1.0"" encoding=""UTF-8""?>" 
    Print #FN, "<kml xmlns=""http://earth.google.com/kml/2.1"">" 
    Print #FN, "<Document>" 
    For i = 1 To rNodes.Rows.Count 
        Print #FN, "<Placemark>" 
        Print #FN, "  <name>i</name>" 
        Print #FN, "    <Point>" 
        Print #FN, "      <coordinates>" 
        dLat = Latitude(rNodes(i, 1))    'Latitude function 
        dLong = Longitude(rNodes(i, 1))    'Longitude function 
        Print #FN, "      " & dLong & "," & dLat & "," & 0 
        Print #FN, "      </coordinates>" 
        Print #FN, "    </Point>" 
        Print #FN, "</Placemark>" 
    Next i 
    Print #FN, "</Document>" 
    Print #FN, "</kml>" 
    Close FN 
End Sub 





    Dim rArcs As Range, rNodes As Range, FN As Integer, i As Long, j As Long 
    Dim dLat As Double, dLong As Double 
     
    'Sets range of arcs to convert to into KML 
     Set rArcs = ActiveSheet.Range("A2", ActiveSheet.Range("A2").End(xlDown).End(xlToRight)) 
    ChDrive Left$(ActiveWorkbook.path, 1) 
    ChDir ActiveWorkbook.path 
    FN = FreeFile() 
    Open "network.kml" For Output As FN    'Output file name in same dir as Workbook 
    Print #FN, "<?xml version=""1.0"" encoding=""UTF-8""?>" 
    Print #FN, "<kml xmlns=""http://earth.google.com/kml/2.1"">" 
    Print #FN, "<Style id=""road"">"            'Sets line color (white) 
    Print #FN, "  <LineStyle>" 
    Print #FN, "    <color>FFFFFFFF</color>" 
    Print #FN, "  </LineStyle>" 
    Print #FN, "</Style>" 
    Print #FN, "<Placemark>" 
    Print #FN, "<name>Network</name>" 
    Print #FN, "<visibility>1</visibility>" 
    Print #FN, "<open>0</open>" 
    Print #FN, "<MultiGeometry>" 
    Print #FN, "<styleUrl>#road</styleUrl>" 
    For i = 1 To rArcs.Rows.Count 
        Print #FN, "    <LineString>" 
        Print #FN, "      <name>" & i & "</name>" 
        Print #FN, "      <extrude>0</extrude>" 
        Print #FN, "      <tessellate>1</tessellate>" 
        Print #FN, "      <coordinates>" 
        For j = 1 To 2 
            dLat = Latitude(rArcs(i, j))          'Latitude function 
            dLong = Longitude(rArcs(i, j))        'Longitude function 
            Print #FN, "      " & dLong & "," & dLat & "," & 0 
        Next j 
        Print #FN, "      </coordinates>" 
        Print #FN, "    </LineString>" 
    Next i 
    Print #FN, "</MultiGeometry>" 
    Print #FN, "</Placemark>" 
    Print #FN, "</kml>" 
    Close FN 
End Sub 
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